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ABSTRACT
Fiscal  rules  are  instrumental  for  restraining 
deficit and spending biases in euro area Member 
States that could threaten the smooth functioning 
of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU). 
Ideally,  fiscal  rules  should  combine 
characteristics such as sufficient flexibility to 
allow for appropriate policy choices with the 
necessary  simplicity  and  enforceability  to 
actually discipline government behaviour. The 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth 
Pact established such a rules-based framework 
for  fiscal  polices  in  EMU.  However,  the 
implementation of the Pact was less than fully 
satisfactory. One year ago, the Pact was reviewed 
and  a  reformed  version  adopted  which 
emphasises more flexible rules and procedures, 
including  more  explicit  room  for  judgement 
and discretion than in its original form. While 
its proponents argued that these revisions would 
strengthen commitment and implementation of 
the  rules,  others  emphasised  the  risk  of 
weakening the EU fiscal framework.  
A year on from the SGP reform, this paper takes 
stock of how the EU fiscal rules have evolved 
and how they have been implemented from the 
Maastricht Treaty to the present day, including 
initial experiences with the implementation of 
the reformed Pact. The first indications are of a 
smoother  and  consistent  implementation,  but 
with consolidation requirements that are rather 
lenient  while  fiscal  targets  and  projections 
point  to  only  slow  and  back-loaded  progress 
towards  sound  public  finances  in  many 
countries. The assessment of the implementation 
of the revised rules is therefore mixed. It is of 
the essence that the provisions of the revised 
SGP  be  rigorously  implemented  in  order  to 
ensure fiscal sustainability. 
JEL classification: E61, E62, H6
Key words: Stability and Growth Pact, Fiscal 
policy, Fiscal rules, EMU 5
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1  INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread consensus that sound fiscal 
policies  are  a  precondition  for  sustainable 
economic growth. At the same time, there are 
well-grounded theories and ample evidence to 
suggest that governments do not always have 
the  right  incentives  to  pursue  an  appropriate 
fiscal course, or that they avail themselves of 
the means to do so. Unless restrained in some 
way, governments tend to spend beyond their 
means and incur large deficits and rising debt, 
which  risks  undermining  economic  stability 
and growth.  
In recent decades fiscal rules have been adopted 
by a number of countries as a means of correcting 
such deficit and spending biases. In the euro 
area,  an  additional  rationale  for  such  rules 
stems  from  the  increased  potential  for  fiscal 
policy spillovers. The Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability  and  Growth  Pact  (henceforth  “the 
SGP”  or  “the  Pact”)  provide  a  rules-based 
framework  which  is  designed  to  prevent  and 
eventually  correct  excessive  government 
deficits and ensure that Member States’ fiscal 
policies  support  the  smooth  functioning  of 
EMU. However, the European fiscal rules came 
under  increasing  strain  when  a  number  of 
Member States – in particular the larger ones 
– incurred excessive deficits as defined by the 
Treaty. In March 2005 the EU’s finance ministers 
agreed on a number of changes to the SGP, with 
the stated aim of strengthening it and improving 
its implementation. 
While the basic rules, notably the 3% and 60% 
limits on deficit and debt in relation to GDP, 
have remained in place, the reformed Pact is 
more flexible and provides more explicit scope 
for  exercising  judgement  and  discretion  than   
in its original version. However, enforcement 
provisions, considered by many to be the main 
shortcoming of the Pact, were not improved. 
Reactions to the reformed Pact have been mixed. 
Proponents of the reform consider that better 
adaptation of the rules to differing economic 
circumstances  and  needs  will  enhance 
commitment to them and thereby facilitate their 
enforcement.  Opponents,  by  contrast,  have 
criticised  the  changes  as  representing  a 
watering-down of the rules, making them more 
complex and less transparent, and as a sign of a 
lack of commitment to fiscal discipline on the 
part  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European 
Union. The ECB saw some of the changes as 
potentially helpful but also expressed serious 
concerns that other changes risked weakening 
the SGP. It therefore called for a rigorous and 
consistent implementation of the revised rules 
that would be conducive to fiscal discipline and 
would  help  restore  the  credibility  of  the  EU 
fiscal framework.1  
A year on from the SGP reform, this paper takes 
stock of the evolution of the EU fiscal rules and 
their  implementation,  and  examines  initial 
experiences  with  the  revised  framework.   
Section 2 provides some background to the SGP 
by recalling the basic rationale for fiscal rules, 
together with some of the issues related to their 
design  and  enforcement  that  have  been 
highlighted  in  the  literature.  Section  3  then 
gives an overview of the EU fiscal rules and 
their implementation since the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty  up  until  the  reform  of  the 
Pact. Section 4 provides an overview and brief 
assessment  of  the  reform,  while  Section  5 
examines  initial  experiences  with  the 
implementation of the new framework in the 
light  of  the  updated  stability  programmes 
submitted  by  Member  States  and  ongoing 
Excessive  Deficit  Procedures.2  Finally,   
Section 6 concludes.
2  SOME BACKGROUND TO THE SGP: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL RULES
2.1  DEFICIT AND SPENDING BIASES 
The primary rationale for fiscal rules such as 
those  prescribed  by  the  SGP  relates  to  the 
observation that, unless restrained in some way, 
1  See ECB (2005).
2  In this paper, our analysis focuses on the experience of euro area 
countries, although most of the provisions of the SGP also apply 
to the non-euro area Member States. 6
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fiscal policies are prone to deficit and spending 
biases. Evidence for such biases can clearly be 
seen  in  the  fiscal  performance  of  most 
industrialised countries in recent decades, with 
those in Europe being no exception. Between 
1977 and 1991, when the Maastricht Treaty was 
signed, all of the current euro area countries 
except Finland and Luxembourg ran persistent 
budget deficits (see Table 1).3 The aggregate 
deficit  of  the  euro  area  countries  was,  on 
average, above 4% of GDP during this period, 
while  deficit  ratios  in  Belgium,  Greece  and 
Italy typically approached or exceeded 10%. As 
a  consequence,  government  debt  increased 
significantly, with the euro area aggregate debt-
to-GDP ratio virtually doubling from 30% in 
1977  to  almost  60%  in  1991.  Meanwhile, 
expenditure-to-GDP  ratios  also  increased 
sharply in most countries. Such developments 
were not confined to Europe: the US and Japan 
also  ran  persistent  deficits,  and  witnessed 
similarly large increases in their debt ratios as 
well  as,  to  a  lesser  extent,  their  spending 
ratios. 
Over time, persistently high deficits and rising 
debt levels such as those experienced in the late 
1970s and 1980s are likely to have a detrimental 
impact on economic stability and growth. From 
the point of view of a central bank, profligate 
fiscal policies can also make it more difficult to 
conduct  a  stability-oriented  monetary  policy. 
Among other things, high deficit and debt levels 
may reduce the scope for governments to use 
fiscal policy as a tool for stabilising domestic 
demand, since deficits that are increasing from 
already high levels could spark fears concerning 
the sustainability of public finances. Excessive 
government  borrowing  may  contribute  to 
inflationary pressures and put upward pressure 
on interest rates, which would crowd out private 
investment.  Higher  debt  also  increases  the 
interest  payment  burden,  which  for  the  euro 
area rose from around 2% of GDP in 1977 to 
around  5%  in  1991,  with  the  result  that 
government spending tends to be diverted from 
more productive uses. 
The economic literature has identified a number 
of reasons why deficit and spending biases are 
persistent, notwithstanding the well-understood 
benefits  of  fiscal  discipline.4  Such  biases 
Table 1 Deficit and spending biases: fiscal developments in the euro area, United States and 
Japan, 1977-1991
(as a % of GDP)
Source: European Commission, AMECO database. Data for general government.
  Average  
  budget balance   Debt   Total expenditure
  1978-1991  1977  1991  Change  1977  1991  Change
Belgium  -8.0  59.5  127.1  67.6  50.7  52.4  1.8
Germany  -2.2  26.8  39.5  12.7  46.7  45.8  -1.0
Greece  -8.7  19.9  82.2  62.3  28.8  44.7  15.9
Spain  -3.9  12.9  43.4  30.5  25.6  42.6  17.0
France  -1.9  19.8  36.2  16.4  42.4  49.4  7.1
Ireland  -8.1  60.0  94.4  34.4  40.1  38.4  -1.7
Italy  -10.3  54.8  98.0  43.3  38.3  52.3  13.9
Luxembourg  1.9  11.9  4.1  -7.9  39.7  -  -
Netherlands  -4.3  38.3  73.7  35.3  47.4  51.2  3.8
Austria  -2.7  28.5  56.1  27.6  44.1  49.5  5.4
Portugal  -6.4  27.3  57.7  30.3  28.9  38.9  10.0
Finland  2.9  7.8  22.4  14.6  39.9  54.0  14.1
Euro area  -4.2  29.9  57.4  27.5  42.2  48.2  6.0
Japan  -1.4  34.9  64.8  29.9  28.3  30.2  1.9
US  -4.1  47.3  72.0  24.7  32.7  36.6  3.9
3  The start of this period, 1977, marks the first year for which data 
for  government  debt  according  to  Maastricht  definitions  are 
available for all euro area countries. 
4  For surveys, see Alesina and Perotti (1995b), Mueller (2003) 
and  Schuknecht  (2005);  for  new  evidence  in  industrialised 
countries, see Balassone and Francese (2004).7
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ultimately derive from a combination of myopic 
behaviour and transaction costs in the political 
process. In democracies voters are represented 
by  politicians  who  are  in  turn  aided  by 
administrations. The resulting institutional set-
up, while varying across countries, generally 
gives  rise  to  principal-agent  relationships  in 
which moral hazard and asymmetric information 
can  easily  lead  to  suboptimal  spending  and 
taxation decisions. 
Within  this  framework,  the  first  well-known 
origin of deficit bias is fiscal illusion. Voters do 
not fully understand the intertemporal budget 
constraint (i.e. the extent to which today’s tax 
and spending decisions will require future tax 
increases  or  expenditure  reductions)  because 
their so-called “information costs” are too high. 
Higher spending and/or lower taxes are therefore 
popular, even if they are not sustainable, and 
this  creates  an  incentive  for  politicians  to 
behave myopically. This is especially true in the 
period preceding an election, which can give 
rise to electoral cycles. Such behaviour is also 
likely to lead to asymmetric stabilisation, with 
higher  deficits  during  recessions  and  more 
limited  or  no  surpluses  in  booms  (Buchanan 
and Wagner,  1977).5 The  problem  of  myopic 
behaviour may be exacerbated if governments 
alternate frequently, since a political party that 
does not expect to be re-elected will most likely 
assign very little weight to the future costs of 
its decisions. In fact, an incumbent government 
may even be interested in expanding the deficit, 
as this may force its political opponents to take 
unpopular  decisions  to  deal  with  its 
consequences.  
Spending biases can result from what is known 
as  the  common  pool  problem.  The  costs  of 
public  spending  are  borne  primarily  by  the 
national (or in some countries the regional) tax 
base. The  costs  are  thus  widely  spread,  both 
geographically and across interest groups. By 
contrast,  the  benefits  of  individual  spending 
programmes are often focused on a particular 
local constituency or sector (e.g. a decision to 
build a new road). Interest groups are therefore 
formed  to  lobby  for  such  spending,  while 
politicians  that  represent  particular 
constituencies or have links to the particular 
sectors concerned will tend to vote for inefficient 
spending  ratios  (Buchanan,  Rowley  and 
Tollison, 1986; von Hagen and Harden, 1994; 
Persson  and  Tabellini,  2000).  Problems  of 
representation  and  distribution  can  also 
exacerbate such biases. Fiscal policy may be 
impeded by “wars of attrition” across interest 
groups  (Alesina  and  Drazen,  1991),  while 
public  debt  may  be  seen  as  a  means  of 
distributing  money  from  tomorrow’s  rich 
(taxpayers)  to  today’s  poor  (recipients  of 
benefits),  as  children  and  the  unborn  do  not 
have lobbying power in that they cannot vote, 
and are thus underrepresented in the political 
process (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989).
Even if governments genuinely wish to correct 
fiscal imbalances, there are reasons why this 
may  be  difficult  to  achieve.  Spending  and 
deficit biases can be entrenched as a consequence 
of self-interested bureaucracies which, through 
various mechanisms, are able to secure budget 
allocations  that  are  higher  than  would  be 
economically  efficient  (Niskanen,  1971). 
Moreover, once fiscal imbalances have built up, 
their correction is likely to be marred by the 
problem  of  time  inconsistency  (Kydland  and 
Prescott, 1977).6 Ex ante the government may 
announce fiscal adjustment, but ex post there 
are likely to be economic or political reasons 
why  it  wants  to  renege  on  its  promise  and 
undertake additional spending. Hence economic 
actors  have  no  reason  to  assume  fiscal 
consolidation in their reaction functions.  
5  There are numerous variants of election cycle models, and there 
is an increasing body of evidence on political business cycles. 
Recent empirical studies that are relevant in the EU context 
include Buti and van den Noord (2003) and von Hagen, Hughes-
Hallet and Strauch (2001).
6  The problem of time inconsistency is typically used to explain 
the  inflation  bias  of  a  government-directed  monetary  policy 
(Barro and Gordon, 1983). Even if the government commits 
itself ex ante to pursuing an anti-inflationary course, it will be 
tempted  once  wage  contracts  have  been  set  to  pursue  an 
expansionary monetary policy that reduces real labour costs and 
stimulates  additional  employment.  However,  rational  wage 
negotiators will ultimately anticipate this and money wages will 
adjust ex ante to the expected monetary expansion. The same 
logic can also be applied in the fiscal domain.8
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Most  theories  of  deficit  and  spending  biases 
focus on these kinds of relationships between 
politicians,  bureaucracies  and  an  under-
informed  public.  More  recently,  however, 
another strand of the literature has developed 
regarding the role played by financial markets 
in  monitoring  public  finances.7  In  principle, 
financial  markets  should  exert  discipline  on 
governments  by  pricing  government  debt  in 
relation to the perceived risks of government 
insolvency.8  However,  due  to  asymmetric 
information and incentive problems, there is a 
widespread  perception  that  the  reactions  of 
financial markets to fiscal developments can   
be deficient (i.e. they exhibit delayed, volatile 
and  non-linear  behaviour).  In  this  context, 
financial market monitoring of fiscal positions 
can be seen as suffering to a certain extent from 
the same problems as monitoring by voters. 
In  EMU  the  elimination  of  exchange  rate 
movements between participant countries has 
arguably  weakened  one  of  the  mechanisms 
through  which  financial  markets  can  exert 
discipline on fiscal policies. The development 
of  an  integrated  currency  area-wide  capital 
market also implies that the cost of additional 
borrowing in terms of higher interest rates is at 
least partly spread across the entire currency 
area rather than being confined to the Member 
State  concerned.  There  may  be  some 
countervailing factors in EMU, such as the free 
movement of capital, which could subject euro 
area  governments  to  more  market  pressure. 
However, there is at least potentially a further 
distortion of fiscal incentives stemming from 
the  adoption  of  a  single  currency  that  could 
exacerbate deficit and spending biases. 
The sharing of a single currency implies that 
the spillover effects of excessive borrowing in 
one country on other countries is likely to be 
greater than would otherwise be the case. In 
recent  years  a  considerable  literature  has 
developed  on  the  issue  of  such  spillovers  or 
externalities as a rationale for EMU wide-fiscal 
rules.9  Given  the  combination  of  a  single 
monetary  policy  with  decentralised  fiscal 
policies, fiscal rules in EMU provide a means 
of ensuring an adequate degree of fiscal policy 
co-ordination with a view to ensuring the overall 
cohesion of the euro area.10  
2.2  THE ROLE AND DESIGN OF FISCAL RULES 
Fiscal rules have been increasingly adopted in 
recent years as a means of constraining fiscal 
policy. Such rules can take many different forms 
and  can  consist  of  supposedly  “hard”  (i.e. 
legally binding) or “soft” (i.e. reputation-based) 
constraints  on  policymakers  or  some 
combination of the two. Fiscal rules supplement 
the monitoring of fiscal policy by voters and by 
financial markets. By providing a benchmark 
against which the actual course of fiscal policy 
can be assessed, a fiscal rule provides useful 
summary  information  which  greatly  reduces 
monitoring costs. This in turn should have a 
positive influence on the government’s incentive 
structure (Schuknecht, 2005). Complying with 
the rule should be rewarded, as expectations of 
fiscal  discipline  are  translated  into  better 
election  prospects  and  more  favourable 
financing  conditions.  By  contrast,  failure  to 
comply provides a signal that fiscal policy is 
inappropriate,  which  should  have  a 
correspondingly  detrimental  impact  on  the 
government’s fortunes.  
The  adoption  of  a  fiscal  rule  per  se  is  not, 
however, a sufficient condition for improving 
fiscal outcomes. The influence that a rule has 
on fiscal behaviour depends on its design and 
the way in which it is implemented. In particular, 
the rule and its rationale need to be understood 
and  supported  by  all  parties  concerned  (i.e. 
politicians, voters and markets), and credible 
enforcement mechanisms need to be in place.
7  For  an  overview  of  the  links  between  fiscal  policy  and  the 
financial markets, see ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2006.
8  Some evidence of financial market monitoring has been found 
(Afonso and Strauch, 2004; Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht, 
2004; Faini, 2004; Balassone, Franco and Giordano, 2004). An 
implicit  assumption  is  that  markets  do  not  expect  a  (full) 
bailout.
9  See for example Detken, Gaspar and Winkler (2004).
10  See ECB (2001).9
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In  recent  years  it  has  become  customary  to 
assess the quality of fiscal rules in relation to a 
set  of  criteria,  of  which  the  most  frequently 
cited are those proposed by Kopits and Symansky 
(1998).  According  to  Kopits  and  Symansky, 
optimal fiscal rules should be:
–  Well-defined.  The  indicators  that  serve  as 
targets,  their  institutional  coverage  (e.g. 
general versus central government) and the 
specification  of  escape  clauses  should  be 
clear  in  order  to  facilitate  monitoring  and 
prevent creative accounting. 
–  Transparent.  Accounting,  forecasting  and 
institutional arrangements should be clearly 
communicated, thereby reducing the scope 
for creative accounting or misrepresentation 
of facts.
–  Adequate. The rule should be geared to the 
corresponding policy objective. For example, 
a rule aimed at ensuring the sustainability of 
public finances would preferably target the 
primary surplus or the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
–  Simple. Rules should be simple in order to 
enhance their appeal to politicians and the 
public. This favours rules expressed in terms 
of the actual (nominal) budget balance, as 
opposed to structural deficits that depend on 
more complex theoretical concepts. 
–  Flexible.  Not  all  circumstances  that  affect 
public finances can be anticipated, and some 
flexibility  is  desirable  to  accommodate 
exogenous shocks beyond the control of the 
authorities,  for  example  by  allowing  the 
operation of the automatic stabilisers. 
–  Consistent. Fiscal rules should be consistent 
both internally and with other macroeconomic 
policies  or  policy  rules.  For  example,  the 
fiscal  rules  should  not  promote  an 
expansionary  fiscal  stance  when  there  are 
already inflationary pressures. 
–  Enforceable. Fiscal rules need to be backed 
by appropriate constitutional or legal norms, 
and  the  consequences  of  non-compliance, 
whether in the form of financial, judicial or 
reputational  sanctions,  should  be  clearly 
agreed upon.
–  Efficient. Fiscal rules should be supported by 
efficient  policy  actions,  for  example,  by 
making  structural  adjustments  rather  than 
having recourse to one-off measures.
As Kopits and Symansky point out, however, no 
fiscal  rule  can  fully  combine  all  desirable 
attributes. For example, a rule specifying that 
the overall budget should always be in balance 
would be very simple and easy to understand 
for politicians and voters. However, this may 
not  be  consistent  with  macroeconomic 
stabilisation  objectives  if  it  results  in  a  pro-
cyclical fiscal policy (tightening in recessions 
and loosening during booms) which then places 
greater strain on monetary policy. A rule that 
takes into account the impact of the cycle on the 
budget balance might be more consistent and 
more flexible, facilitating the operation of the 
automatic fiscal stabilisers. However, it may be 
less  transparent  and  harder  to  enforce,  since 
estimates  of  the  cyclically  adjusted  budget 
balance may be subject to considerable ex post 
revisions, which would then create uncertainty 
as to whether the rule is actually being complied 
with. Inevitably, some trade-offs between these 
optimal  characteristics  have  to  be  made  and 
priorities have to be balanced.
Regarding implementation and enforcement, a 
useful checklist is provided by Inman (1996) 
(see also Buti, Eijffinger and Franco, 2003). 
Adequate enforcement requires that compliance 
with the rule is assessed ex post and not only ex 
ante. It is not the setting of the budget but the 
actual execution of the budget in line with the 
rule that matters. In this context, the missing of 
targets  should  not  easily  be  excusable. 
Enforcement  should  be  undertaken  by  an 
independent agency, and compliance with the 
rules should be open to scrutiny by individual 
citizens or groups, who should be able to request 
an investigation. Penalties for non-compliance 
should be sufficiently large. It should also be 10
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difficult  for  politicians  to  change  the  rules 
themselves. Only if these conditions are mostly 
in place are fiscal rules likely to deter profligate 
fiscal behaviour. By contrast, fiscal rules are 
unlikely to have much of an influence on the 
government if the latter concludes that it will be 
easy to justify non-compliance. 
In particular, the effectiveness of a fiscal rule 
crucially  depends  on  how  it  deals  with  non-
compliance  or  the  missing  of  targets.  Most 
fiscal  rules  include  some  element  of 
conditionality, for example allowing deviations 
from the rule in the case of adverse surprises 
(e.g. a natural disaster or a severe recession). 
However, if such conditionality goes too far, it 
is  liable  to  raise  monitoring  costs  and  invite 
moral  hazard.  For  example,  if  compliance  is 
conditional  on  a  certain  growth  outcome 
projected by the government, the latter may be 
tempted to overestimate economic growth. If, 
as is then likely, growth turns out to be lower 
than projected, the government can argue that 
the failure to meet its fiscal target was due to 
exogenous factors beyond its control. Since the 
monitoring authority’s information set is usually 
inferior to that of the government, it is often 
difficult  to  challenge  the  latter’s  version  of 
events.  In  order  to  be  effective,  therefore,  a 
fiscal  rule  needs  to  include  an  element  of 
enforcement in terms of some target that must 
be  achieved  except  in  the  most  extreme 
circumstances, even if it could be argued that 
this might lead to some ex post inefficiencies, 
such as less fiscal discretion.  
In the multilateral setting of EMU, some further 
considerations  regarding  the  design  of  fiscal 
rules also need to be taken into account. Fiscal 
rules at the EU level need to constrain deficit 
and spending biases while also respecting the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  and  the  fact  that 
Member  States  remain  fundamentally 
responsible for the conduct of their own fiscal 
policies. The EMU fiscal rules therefore need 
to  be  adequate  with  respect  to  securing  the 
objective of sound public finances that support 
the smooth functioning of EMU, but should not 
further  impinge  on  domestic  policy  choices. 
This partly explains why the EMU fiscal rules 
focus on deficit and debt levels as opposed to, 
for example, expenditure even though excessive 
spending may be at the root of high deficits in 
some countries. The EMU fiscal rules also need 
to  be  robust  with  respect  to  the  different 
economic  and  institutional  characteristics  of 
the  various  Member  States,  while  also 
guaranteeing equal treatment. 
There are therefore many factors to be taken 
into consideration when designing or assessing 
the  appropriateness  of  fiscal  rules  for  EMU. 
The following sections provide an overview of 
the EMU fiscal rules, their evolution, and the 
implications  for  fiscal  policies  in  the  euro 
area.  
3  THE EMU FISCAL RULES AND THEIR  
IMPLEMENTATION: FROM MAASTRICHT  
TO THE SGP REFORM 
3.1  FROM MAASTRICHT TO THE SGP 
To  address  concerns  that  large  deficits  and 
rising debt could threaten the smooth functioning 
of EMU, the Maastricht Treaty introduced into 
the  European  Community Treaty  (henceforth 
“the  Treaty”)  a  number  of  rules  aimed  at 
disciplining EU Member States’ fiscal policies. 
These  include  the  prohibition  of  monetary 
financing of deficits by the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) (Article 101) and the so-
called  no-bail-out  clause,  which  states  that 
European institutions or Member States shall 
not  be  liable  for  or  assume  another  Member 
State’s financial obligations (Article 103). The 
former contributes to a clear separation between 
monetary policy and fiscal policy, which should 
ensure that a stability-oriented monetary policy 
is  not  directly  compromised  by  excessive 
government borrowing. The latter makes clear 
that in EMU, Member States do not have to bear 
the  cost  of  financing  other  Member  States’ 
debt, which should encourage financial markets 
to  distinguish  between  different  euro  area 
governments’  debt  instruments,  thereby 11
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strengthening financial market discipline on 
fiscal policies. 
In addition to these basic safeguards, the Treaty 
obliges Member States to avoid “excessive 
deficits” assessed against the reference values 
of 3% of GDP for the deficit and 60% of GDP 
for debt (Article 104). The sustainability of a 
government’s financial position, in the sense of 
not having a deficit that is excessive as defined 
by Article 104 of the Treaty, is one of the 
convergence criteria for adoption of the euro. 
Moreover, breaches of the reference values 
result in the initiation of an Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) with the aim of examining 
and, if necessary, correcting the situation. For 
Member States that have adopted the single 
currency, this procedure can ultimately lead to 
financial sanctions. However, the procedure as 
laid down in the Treaty is in no sense mechanistic, 
and ultimately leaves it to the discretion of the 
EU Council of Ministers of Economic Affairs 
and Finance (henceforth the “ECOFIN Council”) 
to decide whether to take action. 
In the years that followed the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the 3% reference value 
served as a simple yardstick of the success of 
fiscal policy and received considerable 
prominence in the public debate. It greatly 
facilitated monitoring of fiscal performance by 
the public and by financial markets, since in 
most countries the objective of qualifying for 
adoption of the euro attracted widespread 
support, and discussion of the costs and benefits 
of being “in or out” was very prominent in the 
political debate. Indeed, a number of 
governments staked their reputations on 
bringing deficits below 3% in time to be among 
the first wave of euro area countries and, as a 
consequence, fiscal balances in most EU 
Member States improved significantly in the 
run-up to monetary union (see Table 2).11 For 
the euro area as a whole, the general government 
deficit was reduced from 4.5% of GDP in 1991 
to below 3% in 1997. The structural improvement 
Table 2 Fiscal consolidaton in the run up to the single currency
(as a % of GDP)
Source: European Commission, AMECO database.
Note: The figures presented in the table are those that are currently available under the ESA 95 accounting framework. They show that 
in 1997, the government deficit stood above the 3% of GDP reference value in two countries that entered EMU in 1999 (Spain and 
Portugal). The figures available at the beginning of 1998, when the decision on the countries entering EMU was taken, were based on 
ESA 79. Those figures showed deficits that complied with the 3% of GDP limit.
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
General  government  budget  balance        
Belgium  -6.0 -6.8 -7.0 -4.7 -4.4 -3.8 -2.0
Germany  -3.2 -2.7 -3.4 -2.5 -3.2 -3.3 -2.6
Greece  -11.4 -12.6 -13.6  -9.9 -10.2  -7.4  -6.6
Spain  -4.2 -3.9 -6.6 -6.0 -6.5 -4.8 -3.1
France  -2.0 -3.8 -5.6 -5.6 -5.5 -4.1 -3.0
Ireland  -2.2 -2.4 -2.3 -1.5 -2.1 -0.1  1.1
Italy  -9.7 -9.2 -9.1 -8.8 -7.4 -6.9 -2.6
Luxembourg  1.5 0.6 1.3 2.3 2.3 1.1 3.5
Netherlands  -2.7 -3.6 -3.0 -3.5 -4.0 -1.7 -1.1
Austria  -2.9 -1.9 -4.1 -4.8 -5.6 -3.9 -1.7
Portugal  -5.5 -2.7 -5.6 -5.6 -5.2 -4.5 -3.4
Finland  -1.5 -5.7 -7.8 -6.0 -6.2 -3.5 -1.2
Euro  area  -4.5 -4.7 -5.5 -4.9 -5.0 -4.2 -2.6
Cyclically adjusted budget balance
Euro  area  -5.4 -5.2 -4.6 -4.3 -4.5 -3.4 -2.0
General government debt
Euro  area  57.4 59.2 65.0 67.6 72.2 73.9 73.5
11  For a more detailed overview of fiscal developments since the 
early 1990s, see Briotti (2004). 12
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12  The two Council Regulations are Council Regulation 1466/97 
“on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions 
and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies” 
(the  preventive  arm),  and  Council  Regulation  1467/97  “on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure” (the corrective arm). These are supplemented 
by a European Council Resolution on the Stability and Growth 
Pact  and  a  Code  of  Conduct,  although  these  are  not  legally 
binding. 
13  Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth 
Pact, Amsterdam, June 1997.
14  Non-euro  area  Member  States  submit  convergence 
programmes. 
15  On  the  role  of  budgetary  policy  in  responding  to  cyclical 
developments in the context of the SGP see Stark and Manzke 
(2002).  
in the budget balance was even more significant, 
amounting to more than 3 percentage points of 
GDP. 
Nonetheless, concerns remained that the fiscal 
rules as set out in the Maastricht Treaty would 
not provide enough of a “stick” to ensure fiscal 
discipline once the “carrot” of participation in 
the single currency had been eaten. There were 
also concerns that mere compliance with the 
3% of GDP reference value may not be sufficient 
to maintain or reduce debt to reasonable levels. 
Moreover, pro-cyclical fiscal policies would be 
the  result  if  Member  States  were  forced  to 
increase  taxes  or  reduce  spending  during 
recessions in order to keep their deficits below 
3% of GDP. In terms of the Kopits and Symansky 
criteria, the 3% deficit rule was simple; however, 
on  its  own  it  was  neither  fully  efficient  nor 
adequate from a longer-term perspective. Such 
concerns led to the negotiation and signing of 
the SGP, which sought to put more flesh on the 
bones of the fiscal framework of the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
3.2  THE “ORIGINAL” STABILITY AND GROWTH 
PACT
The  SGP  aims  to  prevent  excessive  deficits 
through policy surveillance and coordination, 
and to deter as well as correct excessive deficits 
by providing clear rules for the application of 
the EDP. It is primarily based on two Council 
Regulations,  which  in  accordance  with  their 
aims and functions are often referred to as the 
“preventive arm” and the “corrective arm” (or 
“deterrent  arm”)  of  the  Pact.12  These  were 
backed by a solemn declaration of the European 
Heads of State or Government, which expressed 
Member  States’  political  commitment  to 
implementing the rules in a strict and timely 
manner.13 
Under  the  preventive  arm,  Member  States 
submit  annual  stability  programmes,  which 
present information regarding their economic 
and fiscal policies.14 These programmes include 
in particular the “medium-term objective” of 
fiscal  policy  and,  where  applicable,  the 
adjustment path towards it. In its original form, 
the  SGP  specified  that  the  medium-term 
objective should be a budget that is “close to 
balance or in surplus”. The rationale was both 
to  ensure  fiscal  positions  that  would  be 
sustainable in the long run while also creating 
sufficient room for fiscal policy to help smooth 
output  fluctuations  in  the  short  run  without 
breaching the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling.15 The 
generic term “close to balance or in surplus” 
reflected the fact that while budgets close to 
balance should, as a rule, be sufficient to ensure 
sustainable  fiscal  positions,  some  countries 
might wish to target surpluses with a view to 
reducing debt ratios more rapidly and preparing 
for the costs of ageing populations. 
The Member States’ stability programmes are 
assessed  by  the  Commission  and  may  be 
examined by the ECOFIN Council, which can 
choose  to  make  public  its  opinion  on  each 
programme. The preventive arm also includes 
an early-warning device whereby the Council 
can issue recommendations to Member States 
to  take  corrective  measures  if  budgetary 
developments point to the risk of an excessive 
deficit. Overall, however, the emphasis of the 
preventive arm is on “soft” procedures which 
foster fiscal discipline and policy coordination 
through  multilateral  surveillance  and  peer 
pressure. 
By contrast, the corrective arm relies on stricter 
and more formal procedures designed to enforce 
fiscal  discipline  in  countries  where  deficits 13
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have become excessive and are therefore giving 
rise to greater concern. To this end, the EDP 
already outlined in the Treaty was clarified and 
“speeded up”, in particular with regard to the 
following:  
–  Exceptional circumstances: The conditions 
under  which  a  deficit  above  3%  could  be 
deemed  exceptional  and  temporary  (and 
therefore not excessive) were defined strictly 
as cases in which a country experiences an 
annual fall in real GDP of at least 2%. A fall 
in real GDP of between 0.75% and 2% could 
also be deemed exceptional in the light of 
supporting  evidence  submitted  by  the 
Member  State  in  question  regarding  the 
accumulated output loss and the abruptness 
of the downturn.  
–  The deadline for the correction of excessive 
deficits: It was specified that the correction 
of an excessive deficit should be completed 
“in  the  year  following  its  identification 
unless  there  are  special  circumstances”, 
although  the  nature  of  such  special 
circumstances was not explicitly defined.
–  The timing of procedural steps: A timetable 
with precise deadlines for the various steps 
of the procedure was laid out whereby, in the 
event of non-compliance by a Member State 
with the recommendations and decisions of 
the Council, the time between the reporting 
of  a  deficit  above  3%  of  GDP  and  the 
imposition of sanctions should be no more 
than ten months. 
–  The nature of sanctions: It was clarified that, 
if the Council were to impose sanctions on a 
Member State, a non-interest bearing deposit 
would be required which, in the event of a 
further two years of non-compliance, would 
be converted into a fine. 
With these clarifications, the corrective arm of 
the  SGP  provided  for  a  strict  and  timely 
application  of  all  elements  of  the  EDP. 
Nonetheless, it fell short of the original proposal 
of the German government, which had supported 
a  fully  automatic  sanctioning  mechanism 
outside the standard Treaty framework (Stark, 
2001).  Such  automatism  was  considered 
inappropriate by some Member States. The SGP 
that was finally agreed instead took the form of 
EU secondary legislation with decisions to be 
taken within the standard legislative framework 
(i.e.  Council  recommendations  or  decisions, 
adopted by qualified majority, on the basis of 
recommendations  by  the  Commission).  The 
Commission therefore preserved its “right of 
initiative”, while the Council ultimately retained 
discretion in taking decisions within an overall 
rules-based framework. 
Box 1 
THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE
An EDP is triggered whenever a country’s planned or actual deficit-to-GDP ratio exceeds the 
reference value of 3%. In addition, an EDP can be launched in the case of a debt-to-GDP ratio 
that is above 60% unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference 
value at a satisfactory pace. 
Identifying excessive deficits (Articles 104(3)–(6)): The procedure is initiated by the preparation 
of a Commission report (in accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty) on the economic and 
budgetary situation in the Member State concerned. This report examines, among other things, 
whether the breach of the reference value is exceptional (i.e. due to an unusual event outside 
the control of the Member State concerned, or because of a severe economic downturn) and 14
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The main steps of the Excessive Deficit Procedure
temporary (i.e. it would be corrected following the end of the unusual event or severe economic 
downturn). The Economic and Financial Committee and the Commission then give 
their opinions (in accordance with Articles 104(4) and 104(5) respectively) as to whether or 
not the deficit is excessive.1 On the basis of the Commission’s report and the aforementioned 
opinions, the ECOFIN Council then decides whether or not there is an excessive deficit 
(Article 104(6)). 
Council recommendation (Article 104(7)): If the Council decides that an excessive deficit 
exists, the procedure then provides for a sequence of steps to be taken with a view to building 
up pressure on the Member State concerned to take corrective action. The first step consists of 
the issuance of a Council recommendation (Article 104(7)) to the Member State concerned, 
which follows immediately after a Council decision (under Article 104(6)) that a deficit is 
excessive. The recommendation sets, in particular, the deadline for the correction of the 
excessive deficit, which should be completed in the year following its identification unless 
1  The Economic and Financial Committee is a committee of senior officials from national administrations and central banks which 
advises the Commission and the ECOFIN Council on economic and financial issues.
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there are special circumstances. It also sets a deadline for the Member State concerned to take 
effective action in compliance with the Council’s recommendation. 
Council notice (Article 104(9)): If the Member State takes effective action in the form of 
announced fiscal measures in response to the Council’s recommendation, the procedure is put 
in abeyance and the Commission and the Council then monitor the implementation of these 
measures and their effectiveness. If, by contrast, the Member State does not take effective 
action, the Council decides on this issue (Article 104(8)) and adopts a decision giving notice 
to the Member State to take measures to correct the situation (Article 104(9)). Council decisions 
under Articles 104(8) and 104(9) are also called for in case announced measures are subsequently 
not implemented or prove to be inadequate to correct the excessive deficit within the set 
deadline. Like the earlier Council recommendation, the notice sets a deadline for the correction 
of the excessive deficit and a deadline for effective action to be taken. 
Sanctions (Article 104(11)): Once again, if effective action (in the form of announced measures) 
is taken in response to the Council notice, the procedure is put in abeyance and developments 
are monitored. If, by contrast, no effective action is taken, the Council then imposes sanctions. 
Sanctions are also imposed if announced measures are subsequently not implemented or prove 
to be inadequate. Sanctions consist of a non-interest-bearing deposit combining a fixed element 
(equal to 0.2% of GDP) and a variable element, equal to one-tenth of the excess over the 
reference value, with a ceiling for the overall deposit of 0.5% of GDP. As long as the excessive 
deficit is not corrected, further deposits equal to one-tenth of the excess over the reference 
value (up to the aforementioned ceiling) would be required. After two years, deposits would be 
converted into fines. 
Abrogation (Article 104(12)): The procedure comes to an end when the Council considers that 
the excessive deficit has been corrected and abrogates its decision under Article 104(6).
3.3  EXPERIENCE UNDER THE ORIGINAL PACT
Notwithstanding  the  progressive  fiscal 
consolidation made during the mid 1990s, by 
the  time  the  SGP  entered  into  force  shortly 
before the introduction of the single currency in 
January 1999, most euro area Member States 
were still some way from achieving medium-
term  budgetary  positions  that  were  close  to 
balance  or  in  surplus.  Further  consolidation 
was therefore necessary in order to create room 
for  the  operation  of  the  automatic  fiscal 
stabilisers while maintaining a safety margin 
with  respect  to  the  3%  deficit  ceiling  (Buti, 
Franco and Ongena, 1998). 
In the early years of the single currency, nominal 
budget balances generally continued to improve 
and, by 2000, the euro area budget deficit was 
reduced to just 1.0% of GDP. However, fiscal 
consolidation  slowed  down  and,  from  2001 
onwards,  the  euro  area  budget  balance  ratio 
started  to  deteriorate,  increasing  to  3.0%  of 
GDP by 2003, with only a marginal decline to 
below this level in 2004. 
This return to higher deficits in the euro area 
needs to be seen in a context of persistently 
poor economic growth and, more importantly, 
consolidation fatigue, which started soon after 
the  launch  of  the  single  currency.  Moreover, 
improving nominal budget balances in the early 
years  of  the  Pact’s  implementation  initially 
contributed to the false perception that fiscal 
positions were also getting better. In fact in a 
number  of  countries,  structural  budgetary 
positions started to deteriorate as early as 2000 
since,  in  a  context  of  favourable  economic 16
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Table 3 Fiscal developments under the Stability and Growth Pact 
(as a % of GDP)
Source: European Commission, AMECO database. Data exclude receipts from the sale of Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS) licenses.
Note: The figures presented in the table are those currently available under the ESA 95 accounting framework. They therefore include 
all the statistical revisions that have taken place since 1998 in the euro area countries (in particular, in Greece and Portugal).
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004
General government budget balance             
Belgium  -0.8  -0.5  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.0
Germany  -2.2  -1.5  -1.1  -2.8  -3.7  -4.0  -3.7
Greece  -4.3  -3.4  -4.0  -5.4  -4.9  -5.8  -6.9
Spain  -3.0  -1.1  -0.9  -0.5  -0.3  0.0  -0.1
France  -2.6  -1.7  -1.5  -1.6  -3.2  -4.2  -3.7
Ireland  2.4  2.5  4.4  0.8  -0.6  0.2  1.5
Italy  -2.8  -1.7  -1.9  -3.1  -2.9  -3.4  -3.4
Luxembourg  3.2  3.3  5.9  5.9  2.0  0.2  -1.1
Netherlands  -0.7  0.6  1.5  -0.2  -2.0  -3.1  -1.9
Austria  -2.3  -2.2  -1.8  0.0  -0.5  -1.5  -1.1
Portugal  -3.0  -2.7  -3.2  -4.3  -2.9  -2.9  -3.2
Finland  1.7  1.7  7.0  5.1  4.1  2.5  2.3
Euro area  -2.2  -1.3  -1.0  -1.8  -2.5  -3.0  -2.8
Cyclically adjusted budget balance             
Belgium  -0.4  -0.6  -0.9  0.0  -0.2  0.4  0.0
Germany  -1.7  -1.1  -1.7  -3.3  -3.7  -3.4  -3.4
Greece  -3.4  -2.6  -3.5  -5.4  -5.0  -6.2  -7.7
Spain  -2.6  -1.4  -1.9  -1.4  -0.8  -0.2  0.0
France  -2.5  -2.1  -2.6  -2.6  -3.8  -4.1  -3.6
Ireland  1.8  1.0  2.4  -0.7  -1.8  -0.5  1.4
Italy  -2.4  -1.6  -2.8  -4.1  -3.4  -3.4  -3.3
Luxembourg  4.0  2.9  4.1  5.2  1.7  0.9  -0.5
Netherlands  -1.5  -0.8  -0.3  -1.3  -1.9  -2.1  -0.9
Austria  -2.4  -2.7  -2.8  -0.3  -0.3  -1.0  -0.8
Portugal  -3.4  -3.5  -4.5  -5.5  -3.5  -2.5  -2.7
Finland  0.4  0.6  5.3  4.8  4.3  3.0  2.5
Euro area  -2.0  -1.5  -1.9  -2.6  -2.8  -2.8  -2.6
General government debt             
Euro area  73.0  71.7  69.2  68.3  68.1  69.3  69.8
growth, tax cuts were not matched by equivalent 
expenditure reductions. The fiscal consolidation 
that was achieved during the 1990s was largely 
attributable to an increase in the revenue-to-
GDP ratio, which, for the euro area as a whole, 
rose from 44% in 1991 to 47% in 1999 (see 
Chart 1). However, after 1999 about two-thirds 
of the earlier increase in the revenue-to-GDP 
ratio  was  reversed.16  Meanwhile,  primary 
expenditure, which had been reduced by more 
than 1% of GDP in the run-up to EMU, started 
to increase again after 1999. 
These developments very quickly put the SGP 
to the test. Several countries consistently failed 
to attain close to balance budgetary positions, 
so  that  the  first  downturn  (coupled  with  the 
above-mentioned tax cuts and, in some cases, 
statistical  revisions)  resulted  in  severe 
degradations of budget balances. Six euro area 
Member States have incurred excessive deficits 
since  1999:  Portugal  in  2001  (and  again  in 
2005),  Germany  and  France  in  2002,  the 
Netherlands and Greece in 2003, and Italy in 
2004. Among these, only the Netherlands has in 
the  meantime  succeeded  in  correcting  its 
16  In  this  sense,  recent  experience  in  the  euro  area  appears  to 
support the findings of a growing body of literature on fiscal 
consolidation which argues that revenue-based fiscal adjustments 
tend  to  be  less  successful  (i.e.  less  sustainable)  than 
consolidations  based  primarily  on  expenditure  restraint 
(Alessina and Perotti, 1995a; von Hagen, Hughes Hallet and 
Strauch, 2001). See also Briotti (2004) for an overview. 17
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excessive  deficit  in  a  durable  manner.  Some 
Member  States  increasingly  resorted  to 
temporary measures to comply nominally with 
the rules. Moreover, owing to large statistical 
revisions,  some  excessive  deficits  were  only 
identified several years after the 3% of GDP 
reference value was breached from an ex post 
perspective, after statistical corrections led to 
upward  revisions  of  earlier  deficit  figures.17 
Typically, this took place when initially reported 
deficits  coincided  with  significant  adverse 
deficit-debt  adjustments,  notably  in  Greece, 
Italy and Portugal. 
Faced with deteriorating fiscal positions in a 
number  of  countries,  the  Council  did  not 
implement the Pact in the strict manner that was 
necessary. The first evidence of this came in 
early  2002  when  the  Council  rejected 
Commission  recommendations  to  issue  early 
warnings to Germany and Portugal. Instead, the 
Council took the view that such a formal step 
was unnecessary in the light of commitments by 
these countries to take corrective measures.18 In 
both cases, however, the 3% limit was breached 
and EDPs were subsequently launched.19 
An even more significant deviation from the 
rules  and  procedures  of  the  Pact  came  in 
November  2003  in  the  context  of  the  EDPs 
against  Germany  and  France.  Having  been 
given  until  2004  to  correct  their  excessive 
Chart 1 Euro area fiscal developments 1991-2005: determinants and components  
(as a % of GDP)
Source: European Commission, AMECO database.
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deficits, it became clear by autumn 2003 that 
the measures taken by both countries would not 
be  sufficient  to  comply  with  the  Council’s 
recommendations.  The  Commission 
recommended that the Council should step up 
pressure on both countries by issuing “notices” 
(i.e.  one  step  in  the  EDP  before  sanctions), 
while also suggesting an extension of the 2004 
deadline by one year.20 However, the Council 
failed  to  achieve  the  necessary  qualified 
majority to adopt these decisions, and instead 
issued  “conclusions”  in  which  it  put  the 
procedures  in  abeyance  in  the  light  of 
commitments expressed by Germany and France 
to take effective action to correct their excessive 
deficits  by  2005.21  These  conclusions  were 
subsequently  challenged  by  the  Commission 
and annulled by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) on the grounds that the Council had not 
followed the rules and procedures as set out in 
the Treaty. In particular, the ECJ made clear 
that  the  Council  could  not,  by  itself,  take 
17  Regarding one-off measures and creative accounting see Koen 
and van den Noord (2005). 
18  ECOFIN Council conclusions of 12 February 2002.
19  In the case of Portugal, a public finance audit in spring 2002 
showed that the deficit had already exceeded 3% of GDP by a 
considerable margin back in 2001. Hence, the Commission’s 
recommendation for an “early” warning actually came after the 
reference value for the deficit had already been breached.
20  Commission  recommendations  of  18  November  2003  for 
Council decisions giving notice to Germany and France to take 
measures to correct their excessive deficits. 
21  ECOFIN Council conclusions of 25 November 2003.18
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initiatives  in  the  absence  of  an  appropriate 
recommendation by the Commission and could 
not  replace  a  “procedure”  with  political 
“conclusions”.22  In  the  wake  of  these 
developments,  many  observers  including  the 
ECB  started  to  express  concerns  about  the 
credibility  of  the  Pact  and  of  EU  fiscal 
policies.23
It would be wrong, however, to paint a totally 
negative  picture  of  the  experience  under  the 
original SGP. Fiscal deficit ratios in the euro 
area did not return to their pre-Maastricht levels 
and earlier trends of rapidly rising public debt 
and expenditure ratios were mostly brought to a 
halt.  A  number  of  countries  did  moreover 
succeed in complying with the rules. Among 
these,  Belgium,  Spain  and  Austria  all 
consolidated their fiscal positions further and 
succeeded in reaching close to balance or in 
surplus  budgets.  Meanwhile,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg  and  Finland,  while  loosening 
fiscal policy, did so having entered EMU with 
large budget surpluses, and their fiscal positions 
have remained broadly sound (although, deficits 
have  recently  re-emerged  in  Austria  and 
Luxembourg). While overall fiscal consolidation 
may have largely stalled after 2000, there was 
no generalised loosening of fiscal policies in 
the euro area. It can therefore be argued that 
while the original SGP did not fully attain its 
objectives it did have a constraining effect on 
fiscal policies. 
4  THE REFORM OF THE SGP 
Criticisms of the SGP and proposals to reform 
it have been made ever since its inception. As 
actual fiscal developments moved further away 
from  the  Pact’s  requirements,  and  political 
commitment to the rules waned, some of these 
criticisms gained prominence and became more 
widely accepted. 
A frequent criticism of the original SGP was 
that  it  placed  too  much  emphasis  on  formal 
compliance with rules and took too little account 
of economic circumstances. In this context, it 
was  argued  that  the  close  to  balance  or  in 
surplus  requirement,  which  was  generally 
interpreted as implying the maintenance of a 
broadly balanced budget (in cyclically adjusted 
terms),  failed  to  consider  the  specific 
circumstances  of  each  Member  State,  in 
particular  with  regard  to  long-term  fiscal 
soundness, public investment needs or the costs 
of structural reforms. According to this view, it 
does  not  make  sense  for  countries  with,  for 
example, widely diverging debt levels to target 
exactly the same budget balance. The emergence 
of excessive deficits in a number of countries 
suggested that the mechanisms underlying the 
preventive  arm  (i.e.  monitoring  and  peer 
pressure)  were  too  weak  to  ensure  progress 
towards  sound  fiscal  positions.  Meanwhile, 
when countries did incur excessive deficits, the 
Pact’s corrective arm was criticised for requiring 
prompt corrective action regardless of economic 
growth  considerations.  In  particular,  some 
critics of the Pact considered it inappropriate to 
require  Member  States  to  correct  excessive 
deficits  by  tightening  fiscal  policy  during 
periods of low growth, since this could dampen 
prospects for economic recovery. The Pact was 
also criticised for not paying sufficient attention 
to debt developments, as it did not clarify the 
application of the debt criterion of the Treaty. 
According  to  advocates  of  reform,  such 
shortcomings  contributed  to  a  lack  of 
commitment  and  ownership  on  the  part  of 
Member  States,  the  Commission  and  the 
ECOFIN Council, which could partly explain 
difficulties in applying the rules and procedures. 
To address this, numerous proposals to improve 
or amend the rules were put forward. Prominent 
among these have been proposals to focus more 
on  the  quality  of  public  finances  (Blanchard 
and Giavazzi, 2004; Fitoussi and Creel, 2002), 
to shift the focus of the SGP away from deficits 
and  onto  debt  and  sustainability  (Buiter  and 
22  Ruling of the ECJ of 13 July 2004 on the affair C-27/04 by the 
Commission of the European Communities against the Council 
of the European Union.
23  Statement of the Governing Council on the ECOFIN Council 
conclusions regarding the correction of excessive deficits in 
France and Germany, 25 November 2003. 19
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Grafe, 2002, Pisani-Ferry, 2002), or to replace 
numerical rules with stronger fiscal institutions 
and market discipline (Wyplosz, 2005). 
While some commentators called for a complete 
overhaul of the rules, others defended the status 
quo  or  at  most  called  for  more  incremental 
adjustment (Buti, Eijffinger and Franco, 2003; 
Bini Smaghi, 2004). Defenders of the existing 
rules argued that they were sufficient to preserve 
the sustainability of public finances in EMU 
while also allowing room for the, full operation 
of  automatic  stabilisers  (Marin,  2002).  The 
importance  of  relatively  simple  rules  and 
limited discretion under the original SGP was 
stressed in particular with a view to supporting 
market and public monitoring of fiscal policies 
(Schuknecht, 2005). According to this view, the 
problem was not the rules per se, but deficient 
enforcement  that  undermined  the  deterrent 
power  of  the  Pact  (such  as  the  need  for  a 
qualified  majority  in  the  Council  and  the 
problem  of  “sinners  judging  sinners”).  This 
called for improvements in the implementation 
and enforcement of the rules rather than changes 
in the rules themselves (Gros, Mayer and Ubide, 
2004). 
Prior to the SGP reform there had already been 
a number of incremental refinements to the way 
the  Pact  was  implemented.  Over  time,  more 
attention came to be paid to the influence of the 
cycle, with cyclical-adjusted budget balances 
acquiring greater prominence, at least under the 
preventive  arm.  In  November  2002  the 
Commission  issued  a  communication  with  a 
broad  set  of  proposals,  some  of  which  were 
subsequently adopted by the Council.24 In this 
context, the initial emphasis on setting target 
dates for the achievement of balanced budgets 
was replaced by a Eurogroup commitment to 
annual  improvements  of  underlying  fiscal 
balances by at least 0.5% of GDP (see section 
5.1). Following the procedural impasse in the 
context  of  the  EDPs  against  Germany  and 
France,  however,  the  Commission  decided  to 
launch  a  more  wide-ranging  discussion  on 
reforming  the  SGP,  including  the  option  of 
changing  the  Council  Regulations.25  The 
Commission’s  proposals,  along  with  other 
suggestions,  were  discussed  at  length  by 
Member States in late 2004 and early 2005; the 
outcome of these discussions was an agreement 
to make changes to the SGP as set out in the 
ECOFIN Council Report of March 2005 and 
later implemented via amendments to Council 
Regulations  1466/97  and  1467/97.26  Further 
specifications  on  the  implementation  of  the 
reformed Pact were also included in the revised 
Code of Conduct. The reform adopted by the 
ECOFIN Council left the structure of the SGP 
in  place,  and  did  not  alter  the  fundamental 
elements of the EU fiscal framework enshrined 
in the Treaty, such as the 3% and 60% reference 
values, which were outside the reform’s scope. 
Within  this  overall  framework,  however,  the 
reform did introduce a number of significant 
changes. 
4.1  CHANGES TO THE PREVENTIVE ARM
Under  the  preventive  arm,  the  reform  has 
introduced  various  refinements  to  the  earlier 
provisions  concerning  the  setting  of  and 
progress towards sound medium-term budgetary 
positions  and  to  the  elements  that  are  to  be 
taken  into  account  when  assessing  Member 
States’ fiscal positions. These include:   
–  The definition of the medium-term budgetary 
objective:  Rather  than  being  required  to 
target  “close  to  balance  or  in  surplus” 
budgetary positions, each Member State now 
presents its own country-specific medium-
term  objective  (MTO)  in  its  stability  or 
convergence  programme,  which  is  then 
assessed  by  the  Council.  These  country-
24  See the Commission Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament of November 2002 on strengthening the 
co-ordination of budgetary policies, and the ECOFIN Council 
report of March 2003 on strengthening the implementation of 
the SGP.
25  See the Commission Communication to the Council and the 
European  Parliament  of  September  2004  on  strengthening 
economic governance and clarifying the implementation of the 
SGP. See also Deroose and Langedijk (2005) for an overview of 
the European Commission’s motivations for and approach to 
reforming the SGP.  
26  The changes are laid down in two new Council Regulations, No 
1055/2005 and No 1056/2005 amending Regulations 1466/97 
and 1467/97 respectively.20
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specific  MTOs  are  differentiated  and  may 
diverge from a position of close to balance or 
in  surplus.  They  should  provide  a  safety 
margin  with  respect  to  the  3%  of  GDP 
reference  value,  ensure  rapid  progress 
towards sustainability and, taking this into 
account,  should  allow  room  for  budgetary 
manoeuvre, particularly with regard to the 
need for public investment. For euro area and 
ERM II Member States, a range for country-
specific MTOs, in cyclically adjusted terms 
and net of one-off and temporary measures, 
has been set between -1% of GDP and “in 
balance or surplus”. 
–  The  adjustment  path  to  the  medium-term 
objective: Member States that have not yet 
achieved  their  MTOs  are  expected  to  take 
steps to do so over the cycle. To this end, 
euro area and ERM II Member States should, 
as a benchmark, pursue an annual adjustment 
in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off 
and temporary measures, of 0.5% of GDP. 
The adjustment effort should be greater in 
good times, but could be more limited in bad 
times. Good times are defined as “periods 
where  output  exceeds  its  potential  level, 
taking into account tax elasticities”, while 
the  Code  of  Conduct  specifies  that  the 
“change  in  the  output  gap  could  also  be 
considered, especially when the output gap is 
estimated  to  be  close  to  zero”.  Member 
States  that  do  not  follow  the  required 
adjustment path should explain the reasons 
for not doing so in their programme update, 
and  the  Commission  is  entitled  to  issue 
“policy advice” to encourage Member States 
to stick to the adjustment path. 
–  Taking  into  account  structural  reforms: 
Member  States  may  be  allowed  to  deviate 
from the MTO or the adjustment path towards 
it if they undertake structural reforms, and in 
this  context  special  attention  is  paid  to 
pension reforms which introduce multi-pillar 
systems  that  include  a  mandatory,  fully 
funded pillar. However, “only reforms which 
have  direct  long-term  cost-saving  effects, 
including by raising potential growth, and 
therefore a verifiable positive impact on the 
long-term sustainability of public finances, 
will  be  taken  into  account”,  and  a  safety 
margin  with  respect  to  the  3%  reference 
value must be preserved at all times.
4.2  CHANGES TO THE CORRECTIVE ARM
With regard to the corrective arm, the changes 
introduced go in the direction of introducing 
more flexibility into the EDP, in particular by 
relaxing, adding specificity to or clarifying the 
availability  of  various  escape  clauses.  The 
changes include: 
–  The  definition  of  a  “severe  economic 
downturn”:  The  benchmark  for  a  severe 
economic downturn is now a negative annual 
real GDP growth rate or an accumulated loss 
of output during a protracted period of very 
low  annual  real  GDP  growth  relative  to 
potential growth. 
–  Specification of the “other relevant factors”: 
The Treaty specifies that, in its report that 
constitutes  the  first  step  of  an  EDP,  the 
Commission should take into account “all 
other relevant factors, including the medium-
term economic and budgetary position of the 
Member State”. However, neither the Treaty 
nor the original SGP further elaborated what 
these  other  relevant  factors  might  be. The 
reformed SGP now more explicitly spells out 
the relevant factors that should be taken into 
account.  Regarding  the  medium-term 
economic  position,  these  include,  in 
particular, potential growth, the prevailing 
cyclical  conditions,  the  implementation  of 
the  Lisbon Agenda,  and  policies  to  foster 
research  and  development  and  innovation. 
Relevant developments in the medium-term 
budgetary  position  include  fiscal 
consolidation efforts in “good times”, debt 
sustainability,  public  investment,  and  the 
overall  quality  of  public  finances. 
Consideration should also be given to any 
other  factors  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Member State concerned, are relevant to a 
comprehensive assessment of the excess over 21
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the  reference  value  in  qualitative  terms. 
Special  consideration  will  be  given  to 
budgetary  efforts  towards  increasing  or 
maintaining  a  high  level  of  financial 
contributions  with  the  aim  of  fostering 
international  solidarity  and  achieving 
European policy goals, notably the unification 
of Europe, if they have a detrimental effect 
on  the  growth  and  fiscal  burden  of  the 
Member State. 
  However, when assessing whether or not a 
deficit above 3% of GDP is to be considered 
excessive, the other relevant factors are only 
taken into account if the general government 
deficit  remains  “close  to”  the  reference 
value, and if the excess over the reference 
value  is  “temporary”.  If  the  Council  has 
decided that an excessive deficit exists, the 
other  relevant  factors  will  be  considered 
when issuing recommendations or notices to 
the Member State concerned. 
–  Extension of procedural deadlines: A number 
of procedural deadlines have been extended. 
These include the deadline for the Council to 
issue  its  recommendation  to  the  Member 
State  in  excessive  deficit  (extended  from 
three to four months after the date on which 
the  relevant  data  were  first  reported),  the 
deadline for effective action in response to a 
Council  recommendation  (extended  from 
four months to six months), the deadline for 
the  Council  to  issue  a  notice  if  it  has 
established that no effective action has been 
taken  in  response  to  its  recommendation 
(extended from one month to two months), 
and the deadline for taking effective action 
in response to a notice (extended from two 
months to four months).     
–  Extension of the deadlines for the correction 
of excessive deficits: The standard deadline 
for correcting an excessive deficit remains 
the “year following its identification unless 
there are special circumstances”. However, 
the consideration of whether there are special 
circumstances justifying an extension by one 
year  should  take  into  account  a  balanced 
overall  assessment  of  the  “other  relevant 
factors”  mentioned  above.  Moreover,  the 
initial deadline for correction should be set 
such that the Member State with an excessive 
deficit  will  have  to  achieve  a  minimum 
annual improvement in its cyclically adjusted 
balance of 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark, net 
of one-off and temporary measures. 
–  Unexpected  adverse  events  and  repeated 
recommendations  or  notices: The  original 
SGP  did  not  explicitly  provide  for  the 
reissuance of Council recommendations or 
for  the  extension  of  deadlines  for  the 
correction of excessive deficits, and these 
issues  were  at  the  heart  of  the  procedural 
deadlock  in  the  EDPs  for  Germany  and 
France. The SGP reform has now clarified 
such  matters  by  explicitly  stating  that  if 
effective action has been taken in compliance 
with a recommendation under Article 104(7) 
or  a  notice  under  Article  104(9),  and  if 
“unexpected adverse economic events with 
major  unfavourable  consequences  for 
government  finances”  occur  after  the 
adoption of the recommendation or notice, 
the Council may decide to issue a revised 
recommendation or notice, which may also 
extend the deadline for the correction of the 
excessive deficit by one year. 
–  Increasing the focus on debt and sustainability: 
The ECOFIN Council report of March 2005 
also  called  for  a  strengthening  of  debt 
surveillance,  for  example  by  applying  the 
Treaty  concept  of  a  debt  ratio  that  is 
“sufficiently  diminishing  and  approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace”. 
However, no agreement could be reached on 
a quantitative definition of the satisfactory 
pace of debt reduction, as had been proposed 
by the Commission, and no changes to the 
Pact regulations were introduced.  
4.3  GOVERNANCE  
The  reform  of  the  SGP  did  not,  in  itself, 
introduce  major  changes  in  the  area  of 
governance. In particular, it did not change the 22
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Box 2
STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF 21 MARCH 2005 
“The Governing Council of the ECB is seriously concerned about the proposed changes to the 
Stability and Growth Pact. It must be avoided that changes in the corrective arm undermine 
confidence in the fiscal framework of the European Union and the sustainability of public 
finances  in  the  euro  area  Member  States. As  regards  the  preventive  arm  of  the  Pact,  the 
Governing Council also takes note of some proposed changes which are in line with its possible 
strengthening. 
Sound fiscal policies and a monetary policy geared to price stability are fundamental for the 
success of Economic and Monetary Union. They are prerequisites for macroeconomic stability, 
growth and cohesion in the euro area. It is imperative that Member States, the European 
Commission and the Council of the European Union implement the revised framework in a 
rigorous and consistent manner conducive to prudent fiscal policies. 
More than ever, in the present circumstances, it is essential that all parties concerned fulfil 
their respective responsibilities. The public and the markets can trust that the Governing 
Council remains firmly committed to deliver on its mandate of maintaining price stability.”
basic procedures and voting rules, which in any 
case  would  require  changes  to  the  Treaty. 
However, the ECOFIN Council report of March 
2005  did  make  a  number  of  proposals  and 
suggestions  for  improving  governance  and 
strengthening national ownership of the rules. 
In this context, it called for closer cooperation 
between Member States, the Commission and 
the  Council,  as  well  as  for  improved  peer 
support  and  peer  pressure.  It  called  for  the 
development  of  complementary  national 
budgetary  rules,  the  continuity  of  budgetary 
targets when a new government takes office and 
greater involvement of national parliaments. It 
also  stressed  the  importance  of  reliable 
macroeconomic  forecasts  and  budgetary 
statistics. 
4.4  ASSESSMENTS OF THE REFORM
Reactions to the reform of the SGP have been 
diverse. Several commentators have been rather 
critical. In particular, the proliferation of escape 
clauses under the EDP has led some to conclude 
that the reform represents a significant watering-
down of the rules while not having addressed 
the  essential  problem  of  weak  enforcement 
provisions (e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005; 
Calmfors,  2005;  Feldstein,  2005;  Diebalek, 
Köhler-Töglhofer and Prammer, 2006). Others 
have, however, emphasised positive elements in 
their assessment of the reform. The Commission 
considers  that  the  reform  has  increased  the 
economic  rationale  of  the  SGP  and  should 
therefore  lead  to  increased  ownership  on  the 
part of Member States, although it also points 
out  that  the  Council  deviated  from  the 
Commission’s  initial  proposals  in  certain 
respects (Commission, 2005). The ECB noted 
that some of the changes to the preventive arm 
have the potential to strengthen the framework, 
but that the revisions to the corrective arm, in 
particular the greater emphasis on flexibility 
and  discretion,  risk  weakening  the  SGP  (see 
Box 2 and ECB, 2005).  23
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Assessments of the SGP reform applying the 
Kopits and Symansky criteria for optimal fiscal 
rules  produce  rather  mixed  results  (see,  for 
example, Buti, Eiffinger and Franco, 2005). On 
the positive side, the differentiation of MTOs 
should  make  the  rules  more  adequate  in  the 
sense of taking each Member State’s individual 
situation more directly into account with regard 
to factors such as the sustainability of public 
finances  and  public  investment  needs.  The 
possibility  of  considering  the  impact  of 
structural reforms when assessing consolidation 
efforts could enhance the consistency between 
fiscal policies and other economic policies, for 
example in the context of the Lisbon Agenda. 
One can also argue that the new rules promote 
efficiency  by,  for  example,  distinguishing 
between  structural  adjustment  efforts  and 
temporary or one-off measures. 
In addition, the revised Pact should allow more 
flexibility in adapting adjustment and reform 
requirements to the macroeconomic situation of 
each country. This would support fiscal policies 
that are not only sustainable, but also contribute 
to maintaining overall economic cohesion in the 
euro area by helping contain external imbalances 
or price pressures, for example. Greater focus 
on the economic rationale rather than on narrow 
compliance with numerical rules should provide 
more scope for calls by the Commission and the 
Council  to  tighten  fiscal  policies  beyond 
minimum requirements. It should also create 
room  to  comment  more  on  the  quality  of 
particular  fiscal  measures.  The  call  in  the 
ECOFIN  Council  report  of  March  2005  for 
more attention to be paid to national budgetary 
rules and institutions as a complement to the 
EMU fiscal rules is also positive and potentially 
significant,  as  effective  national  institutions 
and procedures are essential when seeking to 
tackle  deficit  and  spending  biases  at  their 
origin.  
At the same time, the increased flexibility and 
room for discretion in the reformed Pact has 
several  disadvantages.  This  explains  the 
criticisms of many commentators as well as the 
concerns  expressed  about  changes  to  the 
corrective  arm  of  the  Pact  by  the  Governing 
Council  of  the  ECB.  In  particular,  the 
proliferation of escape clauses and the shift in 
emphasis  towards  conditional  as  opposed  to 
unconditional compliance implies that the rules 
are now less well-defined and less simple. The 
new framework is also less transparent insofar 
as  it  is  now  harder  for  outsiders  to  assess 
whether or not decisions taken by the Council 
are consistent with a rigorous application of the 
rules. In addition, it has to be recalled that the 
reform has not changed the governance structure 
of the SGP in any fundamental way. The basic 
incentives for all parties involved and the voting 
rules in the ECOFIN Council remain as they 
were before the reform.   
Overall, while the changes to the preventive arm 
could  essentially  be  considered  as  a  shift  in 
favour  of  more  sophisticated  as  opposed  to 
simple rules, in the context of the corrective arm 
the  increased  flexibility  is  clearly  associated 
with  less  stringent  rules  and  procedures. 
Compared to the original framework, there are 
now more grounds for tolerating deficits above 
3% of GDP and extending deadlines for their 
correction.  In  this  sense,  the  Commission  is 
explicitly requested to avoid a repetition of past 
procedural  deadlocks  and  to  use  its  agenda-
setting power to propose and broker an acceptable 
implementation  that  would  find  a  sufficient 
majority in the Council. All this does not, per se, 
impose a more lax implementation of the rules 
than in the past. However, the risk is that the 
combination of more flexibility, together with 
the  need  to  find  a  qualified  majority  in  the 
Council, leads to lenient decisions. If decisions 
do  become  more  lenient  and  this  is  not 
compensated for by greater political commitment 
and improved compliance, the outcome is likely 
to be higher, more frequent and more persistent 
deficits  above  3%  of  GDP.  This  is  why, 
immediately following the reform, the Governing 
Council  called  on  Member  States,  the 
Commission and the Council to implement the 
revised framework in a rigorous and consistent 
manner, conducive to prudent fiscal policies and 
in keeping with the Treaty requirement to avoid 
excessive deficits (see Box 2).   24
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Box 3
A RIGOROUS VERSUS A LAX IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVISED SGP1
The importance of rigorously implementing the reformed SGP can be illustrated by simulating 
the effects of different procedural decisions and fiscal policy responses in the context of the 
SGP’s corrective and preventive arms following an initial breach of the 3% reference value. 
Two extreme scenarios can be identified. Under a first “rigorous” scenario, the flexibility 
allowed under the rules is not exploited and fiscal policy reacts at all times in compliance with 
the SGP provisions. By contrast, under the second “lax” scenario2, the (old and new) escape 
clauses are exploited excessively and fiscal policy responds opportunistically with a view to 
maintaining a high deficit while avoiding sanctions. It should be stressed that these are merely 
hypothetical examples intended to provide an idea of the possible range of outcomes under the 
revised rules, also assuming a minimal impact of fiscal policy on growth.
Year  Rigorous scenario
T  The deficit breaches the 3% reference value.
T+1  The Council decides that there is an excessive deficit and issues a recommendation 
to correct it in the “year after identification”.
T+2  The Member State complies with the Council recommendation, and the excessive 
deficit is corrected.
T+3 …  The 0.5% annual adjustment path is followed (as a minimum) until the MTO is 
reached. 
  Lax scenario
T  The deficit breaches the 3% reference value.
T+1  The Council decides that the breach is small and temporary and justified by “other 
relevant factors”. However, the deficit situation (unexpectedly) deteriorates.
T+2  The  Council  decides  that  the  deficit  is  excessive,  but  by  now  a  0.5%  annual 
adjustment would not be sufficient to correct the situation by year T+3. The Council 
decides that this constitutes special circumstances and recommends correcting the 
excessive deficit in year T+4.
T+3, T+4  The procedure remains in abeyance pending the implementation of measures.
T+5  The Council observes that the deficit remained slightly above 3% of GDP in year 
T+4, but concludes that although effective action was taken, there were unexpected 
adverse economic events. It therefore issues a repeated recommendation to correct 
the excessive deficit in T+5. 
T+6  The Council observes that the excessive deficit was not corrected in T+5 and issues 
a notice to correct the situation in T+6; but again the excessive deficit is not 
corrected. 
T+7  Citing unexpected adverse events in T+6, the Council issues a repeated notice with 
a new deadline of T+7.  
T+8  A deficit below 3% of GDP in T+7 is observed and the EDP is brought to a close. 
T+9…  The deficit again breaches the 3% reference value and the experience of periods 
T+1 to T+8 is repeated, giving rise to a deficit that averages more than 3% of GDP 
over the long term.
1  Adapted from ECB (2005). For an alternative exposition of theoretically possible scenarios under the EDP, see Calmfors (2005).
2  Note that outcomes akin to the “lax scenario“ could also not have been excluded under the “old“ Pact (e.g. in case of non-compliance 
and procedural breakdown or deliberately lax application of escape clauses).25
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 47
June 2006
5  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
REFORMED PACT: FIRST EXPERIENCES AND 
CHALLENGES
More important than the precise wording of the 
EMU  fiscal  rules  is  their  effective 
implementation. As was noted in section 3, the 
implementation  of  the  original  SGP  was  not 
entirely satisfactory. Even if the new rules are, 
on the whole, more flexible and less stringent 
than the old ones, they can still enhance fiscal 
discipline if they are implemented in a rigorous 
manner. This will depend on whether the reform 
achieves the objective of renewing ownership 
and strengthening political commitment to the 
rules on the part of Member States, or whether 
the reform merely serves as a green light for 
opportunistic behaviour and minimalist efforts 
with decisions guided by political pressure and 
horse-trading (Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry, 2005; 
Buti, 2006). Bearing this in mind, this section 
The implications of these hypothetical scenarios for deficit and debt developments are illustrated 
in Chart 2 for a country starting with a debt ratio of just above 70% of GDP, equivalent to the 
current debt ratio of the euro area, and trend nominal GDP growth of 3.5%, which is slightly 
below the current euro area average but broadly typical of countries in excessive deficit. Under 
the rigorous scenario, the debt ratio is gradually brought back on a declining path, until it falls 
below 60% after 12 years. By contrast, under the lax scenario the debt ratio continues its upward 
trend, rising by more than 10 percentage points of GDP within a decade. 
Chart 2 Scenarios for the implementation of the reformed SGP  
(as a % of GDP)

































examines  the  first  experiences  with  the 
implementation of the new framework one year 
after the reform. It should be stressed, however, 
that  at  this  stage  any  assessment  of  the 
implementation  of  the  reformed  Pact  has  to 
focus  primarily  on  ex  ante  fiscal  plans  and 
decisions and in this sense has to be seen as 
preliminary. Ultimately, the success or failure 
of the reformed SGP will be judged on ex post 
fiscal  outcomes,  in  particular  on  whether  it 
actually delivers a timely correction of excessive 
deficits and the achievement of sound public 
finances in the euro area. 
5.1  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMED 
PREVENTIVE ARM 
Between December 2005 and February 2006, 
all euro area Member States submitted updated 
stability  programmes.  The  content  of  these 
programmes and the assessment and opinions 26
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of  the  Commission  and  the  Council  provide 
initial indications as to the impact of the changes 
to  the  preventive  arm  on  Member  States 
medium-term fiscal plans.27 
MTOs IN THE UPDATED STABILITY PROGRAMMES
According  to  the  revised  SGP,  MTOs  should 
ensure  rapid  progress  towards  fiscal 
sustainability.  As  soon  as  an  appropriately 
methodology  has  been  agreed,  MTOs  should 
take into account implicit liabilities stemming 
from  future  age-related  spending.  In  the 
meantime, however, and in accordance with the 
ECOFIN Council report of March 2005, MTOs 
are  differentiated  primarily  in  the  light  of 
countries’  debt-to-GDP  ratios  and  potential 
growth.  With  the  exception  of  Ireland  and 
Finland, which have high estimated potential 
growth  rates  and  low  debt  ratios,  potential 
growth  rates  in  the  euro  area  generally  fall 
within  a  relatively  narrow  range  of  between 
1.5% and 2.5%. Given this and the fact that the 
measurement of potential growth is also subject 
to a degree of uncertainty, it is appropriate to 
conclude  that  the  debt  ratio  should  be  the 
overriding indicator. 
Taking these considerations into account and 
given the predefined range for euro area MTOs 
of  between  -1%  of  GDP  to  “in  balance  or 
surplus”, the following three reasonable working 
assumptions concerning the MTOs can be made. 
Firstly, only countries with debt-to-GDP ratios 
below  the  60%  reference  value  should  be 
allowed to target deficits of up to 1% of GDP. 
Secondly, countries with very high debt ratios, 
say  above  80%,  should  be  required  to  target 
budgetary  positions  that  are  “in  balance  or 
surplus”. Thirdly, countries with debt ratios of 
between 60% and 80% of GDP should at least 
target  deficits  that  are  close  to  balance  (i.e. 
between “in balance” and a deficit of 0.5% of 
GDP). Note, however, that MTOs may need to 
be much more ambitious if population ageing is 
projected to lead to major fiscal costs in the 
future (see Box 4).
Adopting these working assumptions, the MTOs 
presented by euro area Member States in their 
stability programmes all seem to be consistent 
with the requirements of the reformed Pact (see 
Table 4). The two countries targeting deficits of 
up  to  1%  of  GDP  (Luxembourg  and  the 
Netherlands) all have debt ratios below the 60% 
reference value. Portugal is targeting a deficit 
of up to 0.5% of GDP, which is consistent with 
the fact that its debt ratio currently lies within 
a  medium  range  of  60-80%  of  GDP. All  the 
27  As far as actual fiscal outcomes are concerned, 2005 budget 
balances turned out to be somewhat better than expected in the 
autumn of 2005 while falling marginally short of the targets 
implied  by  the  2004/5  vintage  of  stability  programmes  (see 
panel  b  of  Chart  5).  It  seems  premature  to  attribute  this 
development  to  the  reform  of  the  SGP,  however,  since  the 
relevant fiscal policy decisions and plans were adopted prior to 
the reform, while fiscal balances in some countries were boosted 
by unexplained, non-discretionary increases in tax revenues.
Table 4 Main elements of updated stability programmes and Council opinions 
    Year in which     Recommendation on  
  MTO  MTO achieved  Sustainability risk  national institutions
Belgium  0.5% surplus  2007  medium  no
Germany  budget balance  ~20011-12  medium  yes
Greece  budget balance  ~2013  high  yes
Spain  budget balance  Already  medium  no
France  budget balance  2010  medium  yes
Ireland  budget balance  Already  medium  no
Italy  budget balance  ~2011-2012  medium  yes
Luxembourg  -0.8% deficit  2007  medium  no
Netherlands  -1% to -0.5% deficit  Already  medium  no
Austria  budget balance  2008  low  no
Portugal  -0.5% deficit or better  ~2011  high  yes
Finland  1.5% surplus  Already  low  no
Sources: Updated stability programmes December 2005-February 2006, and Council opinions.27
ECB 
Occasional Paper No. 47
June 2006
other countries are targeting budgets that are at 
least in balance if not in surplus. Among these, 
three (Spain, Ireland and Finland) clearly go 
beyond the minimum requirements, targeting in 
balance or surplus budgets even though their 
relatively  low  debt  ratios  suggest  that  they 
would be allowed to target small deficits. 
The  picture  that  emerges  from  the  stability 
programmes  in  terms  of  actual  and  planned 
compliance  with  MTOs  is  less  satisfactory, 
however. In 2005 only four out of 12 euro area 
Member States (Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and  Finland)  reported  outcomes  that  were  in 
line with their MTOs. Three out of the remaining 
eight  Member  States  (Belgium,  Austria  and 
Luxembourg) plan to achieve their MTOs by the 
end  of  the  period  covered  in  their  stability 
programmes.  Extrapolating  planned 
consolidation progress towards the end of the 
programme periods into the future suggests that 
all  countries  that  are  currently  in  excessive 
deficit  (Germany,  Greece,  France,  Italy  and 
Portugal) do not intend to achieve their MTOs 
until (in some cases well into) the next decade. 
This  horizon  clearly  calls  into  question  the 
relevance  of  these  targets  for  policymaking 
(which typically looks at most at the next three 
to four years as the medium-term horizon) and, 
hence,  for  assessing  medium-term  fiscal 
positions.  
It  is  also  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  the 
MTOs presented in the recently updated stability 
programmes  do  not  yet  take  into  account 
implicit  liabilities  related  to  future  ageing-
related  expenditures. At  present,  the  Council 
opinions on the stability programmes provide 
an  assessment  of  the  sustainability  of  public 
finances  in  the  light  of  such  liabilities,  and 
categorise countries as being either low, medium 
or  high  risk.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  4, 
however, there is no obvious link between this 
assessment and the current MTOs.  
Box 4
MTOs, DEBT DEVELOPMENTS AND AGEING COSTS: A SIMULATION
Under normal circumstances, continuous compliance with MTOs in a range of -1% to in balance 
or surplus should be sufficient to ensure low and/or declining debt ratios well below the 60% 
reference value. As already noted, however, a major consideration for Member States setting 
an MTO is the need to create room to cope with the future fiscal burden of an ageing population. 
This implicitly assumes that more ambitious budgetary targets are needed to reach sufficiently 
sound budgetary positions which, together with appropriate reforms (in particular of pension 
systems) would help to accommodate the increase in age-related spending without having to 
engage in significant tax increases or reductions in other expenditure outlays, and without 
endangering the sustainability of public finances. In this vein, it is envisaged that implicit 
liabilities stemming from ageing populations will be directly taken into account in the setting 
of  Member  States’  MTOs  as  soon  as  an  appropriate  methodology  for  doing  so  has  been 
agreed. 
One way of analysing the implications of ageing costs for MTOs is to ask what path the budget 
balance should follow in order to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio below the 60% of GDP reference 
value until 2050, assuming that the primary balance net of the increase in ageing costs is kept 
at a constant level. For illustrative purposes, let us take as an example a country starting with 
a debt ratio of 70% of GDP and a potential nominal growth rate of GDP between now and 2050 
of 3.5% – a scenario that is broadly consistent with the actual situation and estimates for the 
euro area. Moreover, let us consider three different scenarios for the increase in age-related 
expenditure based on those recently published by the Economic Policy Committee and the 28
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European Commission1: firstly, an average increase in ageing costs that reflects the projections 
for increased age-related spending in the euro area (3.7% of GDP between 2004 and 2050); 
secondly, little or no increase in age-related spending (based on the projections for age-related 
spending in the euro area country with the lowest projected increase); and thirdly, a large 
increase in age-related spending (based on the projections for age-related spending in the euro 
area country with the largest projected increase). For each of these three scenarios, we can set 
the primary balance, net of the increase in ageing costs, at a constant level such that the debt 
ratio reaches 60% of GDP in 2050. 
The results of the corresponding simulations are shown in the four panels of Chart 3. Panel a) 
shows the assumed increases in ageing costs over the next 45 years. Panel b) reports the 
necessary primary balance (net of ageing costs) that is needed to keep the debt ratio below 60% 
of GDP (the path of which is shown in Panel c). Finally, Panel d) reflects the resulting nominal 
budget balance path for the three types of countries. 
In the case of little or no increase in ageing costs, a small primary surplus of just over 1% of 
GDP is sufficient to keep the debt ratio at around 60% of GDP. This corresponds to an MTO 
of just under -1% of GDP for most of the next two decades, which is broadly consistent with 
the floor for euro area and ERM II Member States’ MTOs. In the case of an average increase 
1  “The impact of ageing on public expenditure: Projections for the EU25 Member States on pensions, health care, long-term care, 
education and employment transfers”, European Economy, Special Report No 1/2006.
Chart 3 MTOs, debt developments and ageing costs: a simulation 
(as a % of GDP)
a) Assumed increase in ageing costs c) Debt ratio
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in age-related spending, a primary surplus, net of ageing costs, of around 2.3% of GDP would 
need to be maintained. To this end, it would be necessary to comply with an MTO consisting 
of a small surplus of between 0 and 0.5% of GDP for most of the next 20 years before deficits 
could be incurred to accommodate the increased age-related spending. Finally, in the case of a 
large increase in ageing costs, a constant primary surplus, net of ageing costs, of around 4.5% 
of GDP would be necessary, which would imply targeting budget surpluses of up to and even 
above 2% of GDP for a number of years. Moreover, in this latter case (and also less dramatically 
in the intermediate scenario), the debt ratio increases rapidly as a result of very high deficits 
towards the end of the simulation period, which seriously questions the sustainability of public 
finances beyond the simulation horizon. This emphasises the need for further reforms to address 
the fiscal costs of ageing in countries where these costs are likely to be significant, which may 
need to be complemented by more ambitious MTOs than specified in the most recent round of 
stability programmes.  
THE ADJUSTMENT PATH TOWARDS THE MTO
The benchmark adjustment path introduced by 
the  new  Pact  represents  a  development  of 
previous commitments rather than an entirely 
new initiative. Responding to proposals by the 
Commission, in October 2002 the Eurogroup 
agreed  that  euro  area  Member  States  with 
budgetary  imbalances  should  improve  their 
underlying fiscal positions by at least 0.5% of 
GDP per annum. At the time, it was hoped that 
expressing consolidation requirements in terms 
of  an  annual  adjustment  effort,  rather  than 
setting a date for achieving a close to balance 
budget, would prevent any undue back-loading 
of fiscal adjustment. Moreover, expressing the 
adjustment  effort  in  structural  terms  was 
intended to ensure that consolidation would not 
Chart 4 Stylised representation of the adjustment path towards the MTO 



































a) Bad times followed by good times  b) Good times followed by bad times
compromise the stabilisation function of fiscal 
policy, since the automatic fiscal stabilisers can 
be  allowed  to  operate  around  a  predefined 
structural adjustment path (provided that there 
is a sufficient safety margin to prevent breaches 
of the 3% threshold). 
The provisions introduced by the SGP reform 
differ  slightly  from  the  earlier  Eurogroup 
agreement. It has now been made more explicit 
that the adjustment effort should be measured 
net of one-off and temporary measures, which 
can be seen as a strengthening of the adjustment 
requirement  with  the  welcome  intention  of 
reducing,  if  not  excluding,  the  recourse  to 
measures that do not contribute to sustainable 
consolidation. At the same time, there is more 30
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flexibility in that the 0.5% annual adjustment 
path is now described as a benchmark around 
which efforts can vary in good times and bad 
times. A reasonable interpretation of the 
reformed SGP provisions is that the overall 
adjustment effort should be the same over the 
medium term as in the case of a constant annual 
adjustment of 0.5% of GDP. However, 
fluctuations in the nominal balance could be 
greater, with more scope for differentiating 
consolidation efforts in response to the cyclical 
position of the economy. Chart 4 illustrates two 
scenarios with identical starting and end points, 
but with very different adjustment paths for the 
nominal and structural balance.   
So far, the experience with the new adjustment 
path requirements is partially satisfactory. Table 
5 provides an overview of the planned adjustment 
paths presented in the updated stability 
programmes of the seven euro area countries 
Table 5 Adjustment paths towards MTOs in the 2005/6 updated stability programmes
(as a % of GDP)
Source: Commission assessments of stability programme updates December 2005 - February 2006.
 Levels  Changes
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008  Average
Germany         
Structural  balance  -3,0 -2,9 -1,8 -1,5  0,1  1,1  0,3  0,5
Nominal  balance -3,3 -3,3 -2,5 -2,0  0,0  0,8  0,5  0,4
Output  gap  -0,9 -0,7 -1,1 -0,7  0,2 -0,4  0,4  0,1
Greece         
Structural  balance  -4,8 -3,7 -2,8 -2,4  1,1  0,9  0,4  0,8
Nominal  balance -4,3 -2,6 -2,3 -1,7  1,7  0,3  0,6  0,9
Output  gap  1,1 1,1 1,1 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,1
France         
Structural  balance  -3,3 -2,9 -2,3 -1,5  0,4  0,6  0,8  0,6
Nominal  balance -3,0 -2,9 -2,6 -1,9  0,1  0,3  0,7  0,4
Output  gap  -0,5 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8  0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,1
Italy         
Structural  balance  -4,1 -3,2 -2,3 -1,7  0,9  0,9  0,6  0,8
Nominal  balance -4,3 -3,5 -2,8 -2,1  0,8  0,7  0,7  0,7
Output  gap  -1,5 -1,2 -1,0 -0,8  0,3  0,2  0,2  0,2
Luxembourg         
Structural  balance  -1,5  -1,2  -0,6 0,1 0,3 0,6 0,7 0,5
Nominal  balance -2,3 -1,8 -1,0 -0,2  0,5  0,8  0,8  0,7
Output  gap  -1,7 -1,3 -0,7 -0,6  0,4  0,6  0,1  0,4
Austria         
Structural  balance  -1,6  -1,2  -0,4 0,2 0,4 0,8 0,6 0,6
Nominal  balance  -1,9  -1,7  -0,8 0,0 0,2 0,9 0,8 0,6
Output  gap  -0,7 -1,1 -0,9 -0,5 -0,4  0,2  0,4  0,1
Portugal         
Structural  balance  -5,0 -3,4 -2,6 -1,8  1,6  0,8  0,8  1,1
Nominal  balance -6,0 -4,6 -3,7 -2,6  1,4  0,9  1,1  1,1
Output  gap  -2,3 -2,7 -2,5 -1,8 -0,4  0,2  0,7  0,2
with budgetary imbalances. All at least plan to 
adhere to the 0.5% annual adjustment benchmark 
on average over the course of the programme 
period taking into account a (welcome) phasing 
out of temporary measures. In the cases of 
Greece, Italy and Portugal, planned consolidation 
is somewhat more ambitious than the benchmark 
adjustment path, reflecting the setting of fiscal 
targets to comply with Council recommendations 
and notices under the EDP. For the remaining 
four countries (Germany, France, Luxembourg 
and Austria), planned consolidation is in line 
with (but does not go far beyond) the 0.5% 
annual adjustment benchmark on average. 
However, compliance in individual years is 
much less satisfactory, with these four countries 
all aiming to adjust by less than 0.5% in 2006. 
This back-loading of consolidation efforts is 
not consistent with the spirit of the reformed 
Pact.  31
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In terms of the assessment of good or bad times, 
it is notable that there is a prevalence of negative 
output gaps in all countries except Greece. For 
countries that do not have excessive deficits, 
this  could  provide  a  rationale  under  the  new 
rules  to  plan  less  than  the  0.5%  annual 
adjustment  even  though,  as  output  gaps  are 
gradually  closing,  there  is  an  assumption  of 
above-trend  growth.  At  present,  this  escape 
clause has not been explicitly invoked, which 
should  be  viewed  positively  given  the 
uncertainties surrounding output gap estimates 
and the tendency for negative output gaps to 
predominate  in  the  ex  ante  assessment  of 
budgetary positions (see Box 5). At the same 
time, the lack of fiscal consolidation planned 
for  2006  in  several  countries  represents  a 
deviation  from  the  0.5%  annual  adjustment 
benchmark without any explicit justification.  
POLICY COORDINATION AND REFORM 
As far as the intention of the SGP reform to 
“enrich the framework with a stronger emphasis 
on the economic rationale” is concerned, there 
is  so  far  only  limited  evidence  of  increased 
attention being played to macro-fiscal linkages, 
such  as  divergence  caused  by  external 
imbalances,  demand  pressures  and  losses  in 
competitiveness.  While  it  may  be  that  such 
issues  are  increasingly  taken  into  account  in 
policy discussions, they have not so far found 
their way into the recommendations to Member 
States.
The  discussion  of  the  long-term  costs  of 
population ageing and fiscal sustainability has 
received more attention in the Council opinions, 
and for some countries, recommendations have 
been rather explicit in this regard. There have 
been no explicit attempts by Member States to 
trade-off  fiscal  consolidation  and  structural 
reform  efforts,  which  the  literature  does  not 
find convincing in any case (see EU Commission 
2005; Annett, 2006; or Hauptmeier, Heipertz 
and Schuknecht, 2006). At the same time, there 
is no evidence of countries effectively pursuing 
ambitious  and  comprehensive  consolidation 
and reform strategies. 
With regard to governance, more attention is 
being  paid  to  national  budgetary  rules  and 
institutions.  Especially  in  countries  with  a 
history of deficit and expenditure overruns, the 
Commission  and  Council  are  assessing  the 
prevailing  institutions  and  reforms,  and  in  a 
number  of  cases,  including  all  countries  in 
excessive  deficit,  Council  opinions  contain 
recommendations  regarding  the  need  to 
strengthen such institutions, especially with a 
view to preventing expenditure overruns (see 
Table 4). 
FISCAL PLANS UNDER THE NEW PREVENTIVE ARM
One way of assessing the impact of the SGP 
reform on fiscal plans under the preventive arm 
is to compare the implications for the euro area 
of  the  fiscal  plans  presented  in  the  stability 
programmes prior to and after the reform. Chart 
5 compares how euro area real GDP growth and 
the main euro area fiscal aggregates are assumed 
to  evolve  in  the  latest  round  of  stability 
programme updates compared to the previous 
programme updates, as well as vis-à-vis actual 
developments and the European Commission’s 
spring 2006 forecasts. 
According to the latest round of programmes, 
real  GDP  growth  is  assumed  to  pick  up  to 
around its potential rate and then remain close 
to that level in the coming years (see Panel a of 
Chart  5).  This  is  broadly  in  line  with  the 
Commission’s forecast (as well as those of the 
ECB  and  other  international  institutions), 
although  the  stability  programmes  assume  a 
somewhat quicker return to trend. These growth 
assumptions are similar to those presented in 
previous  programmes,  although  they  have 
become  slightly  more  moderate  and  more 
realistic in the latest round of updates, at least 
with respect to the later years of the programme 
horizon. According to the assessments of this 
year’s programmes prepared by the Commission, 
most  Member  States  have  based  their  fiscal 
plans on realistic or plausible macroeconomic 
assumptions. In Greece and Portugal, however, 
assumptions were still considered to be on the 
optimistic side.   32
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As for the euro area budget balance (Panel b), 
the envisaged adjustment in the latest stability 
programme updates is smaller than in previous 
stability  programme  updates,  amounting  to 
around  1%  of  GDP  over  three  years  (2006-
2008),  compared  to  around  1.5%  of  GDP  in 
previous  programmes.  Moreover,  the  Chart 
illustrates  the  above-mentioned  very  limited 
planned improvement in the budget balance in 
2006  and  an  increase  in  the  degree  of  back-
loading  of  consolidation  efforts.  The  slower 
decline in the planned deficit is also reflected 
in a more gradual decline in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, which is expected to fall by only around 
1% of GDP between 2005 and 2008 (Panel c).28 
Meanwhile,  in  terms  of  the  composition  of 
planned  fiscal  consolidation,  there  is  little 
change  compared  with  previous  years,  with 
most Member States focusing on expenditure 
restraint,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  projected 
reduction  in  the  expenditure-to-GDP  ratio 
(Panel d).  
One way of interpreting these numbers is that, 
having missed targets in previous years, Member 
States are now using the additional flexibility 
provided by the reformed SGP to present more 
realistic  (i.e.  achievable)  deficit  and  debt 
targets. If such targets were actually achieved, 
this would be indicative of a strengthening of 
the  preventive  arm.  However,  the  reduced 
ambition of the programmes also implies that 
28  The comparison of previous stability programme targets and 
actual fiscal outcomes in Chart 5 is affected by recent changes 
to national accounts. The latter have resulted in upward revisions 
of GDP and corresponding downward revisions in government 
revenue, expenditure and debt when expressed as a percentage 
of GDP. This explains why debt-to-GDP ratios and expenditure-
to-GDP ratios were initially observed to be at higher levels in 
the 01/02 to 04/05 programme vintages than currently recorded 
by actual data.  
Chart 5 Euro area fiscal outlook: new versus old stability programmes  
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unless compliance with fiscal plans genuinely 
improves, actual fiscal outcomes may develop 
less  favourably  (or  at  least  not  better)  than 
before the SGP reform. This would imply that 
the  preventive  arm  has  been  adjusted  to 
accommodate existing policies rather than the 
other way around. This will only become clearer 
when the first batch of fiscal outcomes fully 
reflecting  the  impact  of  the  SGP  reform  on 
fiscal policy measures and their implementation 
becomes  available.  Moreover,  the  planned 
progress  towards  sound  budgetary  positions 
reflected  in  the  updated  stability  programmes 
has  to  be  seen  in  conjunction  with  the 
implementation of the corrective arm of the Pact 
and the incentives to avoid excessive deficits. 
Box 5
GOOD TIMES OR BAD TIMES?: REAL TIME AND EX POST ESTIMATES OF THE OUTPUT GAP IN EDP 
COUNTRIES
A  major  challenge  for  the  effective  implementation  of  the  new  provisions  regarding  the 
adjustment path towards the MTOs is the identification of so-called good times and bad times. 
In this regard, the decision to qualify times as good or bad primarily in relation to the level – 
rather than changes – in the output gap is particularly significant. The current round of stability 
programme updates suggests, as does past experience, that there is a tendency for negative 
output gaps (i.e. a perception of bad times) to predominate in the ex ante assessment of budgetary 
positions, particularly in countries suffering from budgetary imbalances. This can primarily be 
Chart 6 Real-time and ex post estimates of the output gap, 1999-2005 
(as a % of GDP)
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attributed to the limitations of the methodologies used for calculating output gaps. It implies 
that in most cases, countries would have an argument for undertaking less fiscal adjustment, 
even in cases where growth is above potential and the output gap is closing. However, bad times 
often come to be seen ex post as “not so bad” or even relatively good, and only then it becomes 
clear that consolidation has been unduly delayed. 
To illustrate this point, Chart 6 compares real-time and ex post estimates of the output gap 
contained in the Commission’s spring forecasts for the period 1998-2005 for the six euro area 
Member  States  that  have  experienced  excessive  deficits  during  this  period. The  real-time 
estimate refers to the estimate contained in the Commission’s spring forecast immediately after 
the year in question (e.g. the estimate of the output gap in 1999 contained in the spring 2000 
forecast). The ex post estimate is the estimate contained in the Commission’s spring 2006 
forecast.1 (It should be noted that by definition, the real-time and ex post figures for 2005 are 
identical, but may diverge as new forecast vintages are published in the future.)
With hindsight, the period 1999-2001, and to a lesser extent 2002 as well, should have been 
viewed as good times, which would have called for additional consolidation efforts. In real 
time, however, the perception was that output gaps were either still negative or close to zero, 
which would have justified less consolidation efforts. There is hence a risk that the new rules 
concerning the adjustment path exacerbate rather than help correct the past mistakes of failing 
to undertake sufficient consolidation during good times.
1  For reasons of data availability and consistency, the estimates shown here are those calculated according to the Commission’s previous 
method (using a Hodrick-Prescott filter) as opposed to the production function approach currently used by the Commission. However, 
the estimation method chosen does not affect the fundamental nature of the results.
5.2  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMED 
CORRECTIVE ARM
One year after the SGP reform, experience with 
the  implementation  of  the  revised  corrective 
arm is limited, in particular since most of the 
revised provisions and escape clauses remain 
untested. Nonetheless, EDPs have been launched 
against Italy and Portugal, and decisions have 
also been taken in the context of the EDP against 
Germany, so it is possible to make some initial 
inferences  about  the  application  of  the  new 
rules.  On  the  whole,  the  implementation  of 
procedures appears to be smoother and more 
consistent. However, this may have come at the 
cost of leniency in the setting of deadlines for 
the correction of excessive deficits, while the 
compliance with these deadlines and underlying 
targets  remains  subject  to  considerable 
implementation  risks.  Overall,  targets  are 
broadly  consistent  with  the  revised  Pact,  but 
projected  progress  seems  too  slow  to  ensure 
that deficits and debt ratios are brought down 
to  safe  levels  before  the  budgetary  costs  of 
population ageing become more acute. 
ONGOING EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURES
At the time of writing, five euro area countries 
(Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Portugal) 
are the subject of ongoing EDPs. Among these, 
Germany and France first exceeded the 3% of 
GDP  reference  value  in  2002  and,  in  the 
following year, received recommendations from 
the Council to correct the situation by 2004 at 
the latest. Following the procedural deadlock of 
November  2003,  this  deadline  was  de  facto 
extended to 2005.29 
29  Following the annulment by the ECJ of the Council conclusions 
of 25 November 2003, the Commission issued a Communication 
in December 2004 setting out its approach in the context of the 
EDPs against Germany and France. In its Communication the 
Commission concluded that the Council’s initial recommendation 
under Article 104(7) remained in force. However, in the light of 
subsequent events, it argued that the 2004 deadline should be 
extended to 2005. The Council endorsed this approach at its 
meeting on 18 January 2005.   35
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While the latest data have confirmed a deficit 
marginally  below  3%  of  GDP  in  the  case  of 
France, Germany’s deficit remained above 3% 
of GDP in 2005. Towards the end of 2005, the 
German government announced a package of 
fiscal measures which effectively postponed the 
correction of its excessive deficit to 2007. In 
the light of the continued breach of the reference 
value, the Council decided to move to the next 
step of the EDP by issuing a notice to Germany 
under Article 104(9) of the Treaty.30 Flexibility 
was shown, however, by granting an extension 
until 2007 to correct the excessive deficit, in 
line with the German government’s announced 
fiscal plans. The reasons stated for this extension 
included  the  fact  that  Germany’s  budgetary 
adjustment was embedded in a comprehensive 
strategy, that measures were well advanced in 
the legislative process and that some measures 
already  implemented  would  only  produce 
results with a lag. It was also deemed sufficient 
that  Germany  would  comply  with  the  0.5% 
annual adjustment path on average in 2006 and 
2007 rather than in each individual year. 
The EDP against Greece was launched in 2004 
(following  an  initial  breach  of  the  reference 
value in 2003), and the Greek government was 
given until 2005 to correct the excessive deficit. 
By early 2005 it became clear that Greece was 
not  going  to  comply  with  this  deadline,  in 
particular  given  that  statistical  revisions  had 
pushed  Greece’s  deficit  well  above  the  3% 
threshold (and also confirmed breaches of the 
reference value in earlier years). The Council 
therefore  issued  a  notice  to  Greece  to  take 
measures  to  correct  its  excessive  deficit  by 
2006. In autumn 2005, the Council considered 
that  Greece  had  taken  effective  action  in 
response  to  the  Council  notice,  and  this 
assessment  was  confirmed  in  the  Council’s 
March  2006  opinion  on  Greece’s  updated 
stability  programme.  Nonetheless,  the  fiscal 
situation in Greece continues to be blurred by 
large  discrepancies  between  the  headline 
Maastricht deficit and the government’s much 
higher net borrowing requirement. 
EDPs against Italy and Portugal were launched 
shortly  after  the  SGP  reform.  In  the  case  of 
Italy, this was due to a breach of the 3% deficit 
limit being confirmed for 2004. Moreover, due 
to low growth and a phasing-out of temporary 
measures,  the  government  announced  that  it 
planned an even higher deficit of around 4% of 
GDP in 2005. Portugal, meanwhile, announced 
that it would no longer take temporary measures 
to keep its deficit below 3% of GDP as it had 
done in the previous three years and that, as a 
result, its deficit in 2005 would rise to around 
6% of GDP.  
In July and September 2005 respectively, the 
Council  decided  that  Italy  and  Portugal  had 
excessive deficits and issued recommendations 
for  their  correction.31  Since  neither  Italy  nor 
Portugal could be considered to have deficits 
that were close to and only temporarily above 
3%  of  GDP,  the  revised  exceptional 
circumstances clause was not invoked, and the 
Commission’s assessment of the other relevant 
factors  was  not  taken  into  account  when 
deciding  whether  or  not  the  deficits  were 
excessive. 
When setting the deadlines for the correction of 
the excessive deficits, however, in both cases 
“special circumstances” were found to warrant 
extensions.  In  the  case  of  Italy,  the  cyclical 
weakness of the economy and the size of the 
required  adjustment  were  deemed  sufficient 
grounds to grant a one-year extension of the 
deadline to 2007. In the case of Portugal, the 
same  reasons  as  well  as  the  intention  to  no 
longer  rely  on  temporary  measures  were 
considered as warranting an extension by two 
years  to  2008.  In  both  cases,  the  Council 
recommendations  accepted  the  2005  budget 
plans,  but  called  for  significant  budgetary 
adjustment towards the 3% reference value in 
30  Council Decision of 14 March 2006 giving notice to Germany 
to take measures to correct its excessive deficit.
31  Council  Recommendation  of  28  July  2005  with  a  view  to 
bringing to an end the situation of an excessive deficit in Italy; 
Council Recommendation of 20 September 2005 with a view to 
bringing  to  an  end  the  situation  of  an  excessive  deficit  in 
Portugal.36
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2006. Based largely on its assessment of 2005 
budget outcomes and 2006 budget plans, the 
Council has so far deemed the action taken by 
Italy  and  Portugal  to  be  consistent  with  its 
recommendations,  but  has  also  pointed  to 
implementation risks in both countries, calling 
for a rigorous implementation of budget plans 
and implementation of additional measures as 
necessary. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
NEW CORRECTIVE ARM 
The initial experience outlined above suggests 
that the changes introduced by the SGP reform 
have  facilitated  decision-making  under  the 
corrective arm. Procedural deadlocks such as 
the one that occurred in the context of the EDPs 
for  Germany  and  France  in  November  2003 
have been avoided. All deficits above 3% of 
GDP have been considered excessive (i.e. the 
“close  to  and  temporary”  condition  of  the 
revised Pact has been properly applied). In the 
case of Germany, a decision to issue a Council 
notice under Article 104(9) of the Treaty (which 
was  the  main  stumbling  block  in  November 
2003)  has  since  been  taken  without  any 
controversy.  Fiscal  targets  in  the  affected 
countries are in line with (but do not go beyond) 
minimum  requirements  under  the  respective 
EDPs. Moreover, with the exception of Greece 
recourse to temporary measures appears to be 
significantly  reduced,  which  is  encouraging 
given that the extended use of one-off measures 
and  creative  accounting  was  a  factor  that 
undermined the implementation of the original 
SGP. 
With  regard  to  the  use  of  the  additional 
flexibility and broader escape clauses, it may be 
premature  to  draw  any  firm  conclusions, 
particularly since initial experiences may reflect 
a transition from the old to a new steady state. 
However,  in  all  three  countries  for  which 
important  decisions  have  been  taken,  the 
invoking of special circumstances (in the cases 
of Portugal and Italy) and ad hoc justifications 
(in the case of Germany) to extend deadlines 
could be viewed as a lenient implementation of 
the new rules. 
While the SGP reform aimed at improving the 
consistency  between  requirements  under  the 
EDP and the broader economic requirements of 
affected countries, there are only limited signs 
of  this  in  practice.  For  example,  Council 
recommendations and notices point to the need 
for debt reduction but do not explicitly tie this 
in  with  consolidation  plans.  Similarly, 
divergence in terms of demand pressures, asset 
price  developments  and/or  competitiveness 
does not explicitly feed into recommendations 
regarding  stricter  adjustment  needs  or  into 
advice concerning structural reforms designed 
to  enhance  the  quality  of  public  finances. 
Moreover,  when  broader  considerations  are 
cited in the context of determining the required 
consolidation path, this tends, as in the case of 
Germany, to go in the direction of extending 
deadlines and allowing consolidation delays. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the 
experience so far is that the new rules introduced 
by  the  reform  are  themselves  malleable.  For 
example, while the reformed Pact refers to the 
possibility  of  extending  deadlines  “by  one 
year”,  deadlines  have  been  extended  by  two 
years in the cases of Portugal and Germany. In 
the case of Germany, the “annual” 0.5% of GDP 
adjustment benchmark was applied in cumulative 
terms over a two-year period (hence becoming 
a “biennial” benchmark) in order to accommodate 
a longer deadline. Hence, even if one rationale 
behind the SGP reform was to clarify and codify 
the flexibility or judgement that had previously 
been  exercised  under  the  EDP,  room  for 
(additional) discretion remains. 
From the perspective of governance, it is notable 
that all recommendations issued so far under 
the  reformed  corrective  arm  have  effectively 
endorsed the budget plans of the Member States 
concerned,  although  in  some  cases  the  latter 
may  already  have  reflected  the  interests  and 
concerns  of  the  Commission  and  the  other 
Member States. The emphasis has thus been on 
peer support for previously announced policies 
(with the Member State in question acting as 
leader, and the Council as a follower). Moreover, 
the call for “closer co-operation between the 37
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Member States, the Commission and the 
Council” seems to be implemented by the 
Commission in trying to strike a balance 
between issuing recommendations that boost 
consolidation in line with the revised Pact while 
also achieving qualified majority support in the 
Council. In this way the Commission acts as a 
“consensus builder”, which has the advantage 
of facilitating a smooth implementation of the 
EDP, but also limits the Commission’s ability to 
act as an independent arbiter. 
The implementation of EDPs (and the reformed 
SGP more generally) has also been facilitated 
by 2005 fiscal outcomes in most countries 
staying broadly in line with or even exceeding 
expectations. However, a number of challenges 
remain on the horizon that could potentially 
place considerable strain on the new rules and 
procedures. 
An immediate concern is the question of how to 
proceed in the context of the EDP against France. 
While France’s deficit was brought marginally 
below the 3% of GDP reference value in 2005, 
the Commission’s spring 2006 economic 
forecasts point to the likelihood of a renewed 
breach of the reference value in 2006 or 2007, 
indicating that France’s excessive deficit is yet 
to be corrected in a sustainable manner. The 
circumstances under which the Council decides 
to bring the EDP against France to a close is 
likely to be an important indicator of whether 
the supposedly enhanced economic rationale of 
the reformed SGP, and the increased focus on 
sustainability, is reflected in actual decisions. 
Another issue is that Greece, Italy and Portugal 
have so far been deemed to be complying with 
their respective Council recommendations at 
least partly on the basis of their budgetary targets, 
rather than through concrete and credible 
adjustment measures that form part of a 
comprehensive strategy. The Commission’s 
spring 2006 forecasts confirm that there is a 
significant risk of non-compliance in these 
countries. In the event that one or another of 
these countries fails to meet its obligations, an 
important test of the new rules will be whether or 
not the ex ante flexibility granted in the initial 
deadlines will be matched by a greater willingness 
to enforce compliance ex post.  
IMPLICATIONS OF EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURES 
FOR THE PUBLIC FINANCE OUTLOOK
A slow correction of excessive deficits can 
result in deficits remaining close to or above 
3% of GDP on average over extended periods of 
time. Even if the targets set in the most recent 
recommendations and notices were all met, in 
the decade since the SGP came into force, 
deficits will have been above 3% of GDP for 
five years in Germany and Italy, six years in 
Portugal and seven years in Greece (see 
Table 6 Overview of excessive deficit procedures and implications for deficit and debt 
developments
 Germany  Greece  France  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal 
Year in which deﬁ  cit ﬁ  rst exceeded 3% of GDP  2002  1999  2002  2001  2003  (1) 2000
        (2)  2005
Year in which deﬁ  cit was declared excessive  2003  2004  2003  2005  2004  (1) 2002
        (2)  2005
Deadline  (Article  104.7)  2004/5 2005  2004/5 2007 2004  (1)  2003
        (2)  2008
Deadline (Article 104.9)  2007  2006  -  -  -  -
        -
Years above 3% if current targets are met 1)  5 7 3 5 1 6
Average deﬁ  cit 1999-2005 (% of GDP)  2.9  5.1  2.7  2.9  0.8  3.5
Change in the debt-to-GDP ratio 1999-2005  6.5  -4.8  8.2  -9.2  -8.6  11.9
Note: In 2004 Greece reported deficit and debt figures for the period 1997-2003 which were considerably higher than the previously 
released figures, and which showed deficits in excess of 3% of GDP over the whole period.
1) Number of years during the period 1999-2009 that the country will have had a deficit above 3%  of GDP assuming that, for the period 
2006-2009, the fiscal targets currently laid down in its stability programme are met. 38
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Chart 7 Debt outlook for EDP countries and the euro area under different scenarios  
(as a % of GDP)
a) Germany b) Greece
c) France d) Italy
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Note: DDA = deficit-debt adjustment. Assumptions: (i) potential real GDP growth in line with the Economic Policy Committee report 
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Table 6). One implication of this is that, with 
the exception of the Netherlands, the countries 
that have been subject to EDPs have, on average, 
had deficits close to or above 3% of GDP since 
the  start  of  monetary  union.  In  the  cases  of 
Germany, France and Portugal, this has led to 
notable increases in their debt-to-GDP ratios, 
while in Greece and Italy debt-to-GDP ratios 
remain at very high levels, with little decline 
observed in recent years. 
As far as developments since the SGP reform 
are concerned, it remains to be seen whether 
current  consolidation  strategies  and  their 
implementation under the revised Pact will be 
sufficient  to  bring  debt  ratios  down  at  a 
satisfactory  pace,  if  at  all,  before  the  fiscal 
impact of ageing places additional strains on 
public finances. 
To illustrate what is at stake, Chart 7 simulates 
the  evolution  of  the  debt  ratio  over  the  next 
decade for the countries currently in an excessive 
deficit  situation  as  well  as  for  the  euro  area 
under  three  different  scenarios.  In  the  first 
scenario,  current  stability  programme  targets 
and  compliance  with  SGP  requirements  are 
fully  respected.  In  the  second  scenario,  the 
average deficit of the past five years (i.e. the 
period 2001-2005) is maintained for the coming 
decade  (and  there  are  no  deficit-debt 
adjustments,  so  that  changes  in  the  debt-to-
GDP ratio are driven solely by the deficit ratio 
and nominal GDP growth). Finally, taking into 
account the fact that for some countries, debt 
developments have been negatively affected in 
recent years by deficit-debt adjustments, a third 
scenario is presented in which the debt ratio is 
driven  by  the  borrowing  requirement  rather 
than the deficit (again assuming that the average 
of the past five years is maintained).32 For all 
countries it is assumed that GDP grows in line 
with  potential  as  estimated  in  the  recent 
Commission/Economic  Policy  Committee 
report  on  the  budgetary  impact  of  ageing 
populations. (Regarding the link between steady 
state deficit and debt ratios and GDP growth, 
see Box 6)
These  three  different  scenarios  imply  a  very 
wide range of possible paths for the debt ratio. 
For Germany, France and Portugal, compliance 
with  current  targets  would  imply  debt  ratios 
below 60% of GDP by 2015, compared to ratios 
of  close  to  or  above  80%  in  the  alternative 
scenario(s). For Italy, the difference is between 
a debt ratio that declines slowly but steadily 
towards  80%  of  GDP  and  a  debt  ratio  that 
remains at around 100% of GDP. For Greece, 
the  contrast  is  most  stark,  with  a  debt  ratio 
falling to around 70% of GDP at one extreme, 
and  a  debt  ratio  climbing  to  above  130%  of 
GDP by 2015 at the other extreme.  
Box 6
DEFICITS AND THE DEBT CRITERION: SOME SIMPLE ARITHMETIC
In the steady state, a country’s debt-to GDP ratio should converge to a level that is equal to the 
deficit ratio divided by the nominal growth rate of GDP:
      d
b = —
      y
where b is the debt-to-GDP ratio, d is the deficit-to-GDP ratio and y is the nominal growth rate 
of GDP. At the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed, a nominal growth rate of GDP of 5% per 
annum, consisting of a real GDP growth rate of around 3% and an inflation rate of around 2% 
(broadly in line with price stability), was assumed to be a reasonable estimate of the long-term 
32  The borrowing requirement refers to transactions in debt and is 
equal to the change in the debt ratio minus certain valuation 
effects.40
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growth potential of the European economy. This assumption linked the deficit and debt criteria 
of the Treaty in the sense that, in the steady state, a deficit ratio of below 3% of GDP should 
be  sufficient  to  ensure  a  debt-to-GDP  ratio  below  the  60%  reference  value,  since, 
arithmetically: 
        0.03
0.6 = ——
        0.05
Since the early 1990s, however, trend growth in the euro area has declined and most estimates 
now point to potential real GDP growth in the order of 2% per annum, implying trend nominal 
GDP growth of around or slightly below 4%. A consequence of this is that the deficit ratio 
needed to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio at a level safely below the 60% reference value is now 
closer to 2% of GDP rather than the 3% initially assumed in the Treaty. Or in other words, a 
deficit ratio of 3% of GDP would stabilise the debt ratio at levels somewhat above 60% of GDP 
(85% of GDP in case of nominal GDP growth of 3.5% per annum). While the EU’s Lisbon 
agenda of structural reforms aims at raising potential growth rates above present levels, other 
factors, notably the ageing of populations, continue to work in the opposite direction so that 
potential growth rates may decline further in the years to come. This would make the deficit 
requirements for stabilising the debt ratio even more stringent than in the past. 
6  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Both theory and evidence suggest that, in the 
absence of adequate countervailing mechanisms, 
governments are prone to spend beyond their 
means,  thereby  incurring  high  deficits  and 
causing public debt to increase, with adverse 
economic consequences in the long run. 
Fiscal rules are supposed to correct the deficit 
and  spending  biases  of  governments  and  to 
provide  an  anchor  or  signal  regarding  the 
sustainable course of fiscal policies. The design 
of  such  rules  needs,  however,  to  take  into 
account  the  transmission  channels  through 
which  fiscal  discipline  is  fostered,  including 
the constraints and mechanisms that strengthen 
external monitoring and the scrutiny of fiscal 
policy. This means that a trade-off has to be 
made  between  adopting  fiscal  rules  that  are 
optimal in the sense of allowing a fine tuning 
of policy responses to all circumstances, and 
rules that are sufficiently clear and simple so 
that  they  can  be  fully  understood  and 
enforced. 
In the run-up to monetary union, fiscal positions 
in  euro  area  Member  States  improved 
significantly  as  the  3%  deficit  limit  of  the 
Maastricht Treaty for participation in the single 
currency set a clear benchmark against which 
fiscal  policies  could  be  assessed.  The  SGP, 
adopted  shortly  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
euro,  was  intended  to  provide  an  additional 
means of maintaining fiscal discipline once the 
incentive  of  EMU  membership  had  been 
achieved. The SGP’s preventive arm, including 
the close to balance or in surplus requirement 
and the provisions for multilateral surveillance, 
sought to approximate an effective fiscal policy 
rule while remaining relatively simple, ensuring 
equal treatment, and respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity. Meanwhile, the corrective arm of 
the  SGP,  consisting  of  a  hard  3%  limit  on 
deficits backed up by a sanctioning procedure, 
was  intended  to  ensure  a  minimum  of  fiscal 
discipline and to provide an ultimate anchor for 
fiscal policy expectations. 
Experience with the implementation of the SGP 
has been mixed, however. While some countries 
managed  to  achieve  and  maintain  sound 
budgetary  positions,  half  of  the  euro  area 41
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Member  States  (including  the  largest  three, 
Germany, France and Italy) incurred excessive 
deficits, and all but one of these remain to be 
corrected in a sustainable manner. Moreover, as 
fiscal positions deteriorated, the implementation 
of  the  SGP  procedures  became  beset  with 
difficulties. 
In  2005,  the  ECOFIN  Council  agreed  on  a 
reform  of  the  SGP.  The  reform  did  not 
fundamentally change the Pact’s original two 
armed (i.e. its preventive/corrective) structure. 
However, a number of adjustments have been, 
made. Under the preventive arm, Member States’ 
medium-term  objectives  now  more  closely 
reflect country-specific situations in terms of 
debt  and  growth  dynamics.  Moreover,  the 
corrective arm has been made more flexible.  
While the changes to the preventive arm could 
essentially be considered as a shift in favour of 
sophisticated as opposed to simple rules, in the 
context  of  the  corrective  arm  increased 
flexibility is associated with less stringent rules 
and  procedures.  Compared  to  the  original 
framework,  there  are  now  more  grounds  for 
permitting  deficits  above  3%  of  GDP  and 
extending deadlines for their correction. There 
is a risk that this will result in more frequent 
and more persistent deficits above 3% of GDP 
and less favourable debt developments, which 
could  in  turn  have  an  adverse  effect  on 
expectations concerning fiscal discipline and 
macroeconomic stability.  
Now  that  the  SGP  has  been  reformed,  what 
matters  is  the  effective  and  rigorous 
implementation  of  the  new  framework. 
Approximately one year after the reform, it is 
possible to draw some initial conclusions in this 
respect,  albeit  focused  primarily  on  ex  ante 
fiscal plans and decisions and not yet on ex post 
fiscal  outcomes.  On  the  whole,  experiences 
have been mixed and further improvements are 
needed. 
Member States have set themselves appropriate 
MTOs, plan the phasing out of one-off measures 
and  make  reasonable  assumptions  about  the 
macroeconomic outlook. Nonetheless, in many 
cases  planned  progress  towards  achieving 
MTOs  is  very  slow  and  planned  budgetary 
consolidation  is,  on  the  whole,  slightly  less 
ambitious and more back-loaded than prior to 
the reform. This could be interpreted as a move 
towards greater realism in the setting of targets, 
but  it  could  also  be  indicative  of  reduced 
incentives for Member States to achieve sound 
budgetary  positions  over  the  medium  term. 
Moreover, while there has been some progress 
in  focusing  on  issues  related  to  long-term 
sustainability and budgetary institutions, there 
is so far only limited evidence that the “enhanced 
economic rationale” of the revised Pact is being 
used  to  more  explicitly  link  considerations 
regarding  high  debt  ratios,  ageing  costs, 
structural weaknesses, economic “good times” 
or  broader  macro-fiscal  linkages  with  the 
specification of stricter adjustment and reform 
needs.
In the context of the corrective arm, most of the 
changes to the Pact have not yet been tested, 
although  some  important  decisions  have 
nevertheless been taken. Experience points to a 
smoother, relatively consistent implementation 
of the procedures, including moving to further 
procedural steps. At the same time, deadlines 
have  been  extended  on  the  basis  of  special 
circumstances and ad hoc justifications (while 
in  one  case,  the  0.5%  annual  adjustment 
requirement  has  been  stretched  to  apply  on 
average  over  a  two  year  horizon).  Some 
increased attention is being paid to sustainability 
concerns and to the need to improve national 
fiscal  rules  and  institutions.  Regarding  the 
substance  of  fiscal  plans  in  EDP  countries, 
fiscal  targets  are  broadly  consistent  with 
Council  recommendations,  but  the  latter  are 
rather  lenient  and  imply  that  progress  with 
fiscal consolidation in the euro area would be 
rather  slow.  Moreover,  compliance  with 
recommendations  continues  to  be  subject  to 
significant implementation risks.
In terms of the implications for public finances 
in  the  coming  years,  much  depends  on  how 
Member States, the Council and the Commission 42
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implement  the  revised  rules  and  use  the 
flexibility  that  they  imply.  If  the  rules  are 
applied  in  a  rigorous  manner  (i.e.  sufficient 
structural adjustment is required and compliance 
improves), fiscal positions should converge to 
levels that are consistent with the sustainability 
of public finances. But if implementation is lax 
in the sense that requirements are lenient and 
compliance  is  weak,  imbalances  will  remain 
large or even be exacerbated leading to debt 
ratios that follow an unsustainable path. 43
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